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THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN IN LAND USE REGULATION
Daniel R. Mandelker*t
planning for the development of American comCmunities has a long
and respectable history. Beginning with the
OMPREHENSIVE

"city beautiful" movement of the late nineteenth century, comprehensive planning gained support as a process that could assist American
communities in providing a pleasant, livable, and well-ordered urban
environment. But the first planning efforts did not fully meet this
challenge. Early state enabling legislation reflected a narrow perspective that generally limited local governments to planning for
public facilities and land use. 1 Conservative judicial opinions neither
required municipalities to adopt comprehensive plans as the basis for
exercising land use control powers nor immediately recognized that
the policies underlying local comprehensive plans should play a significant role in land use control administration. 2
Increasing urbanization and growing public concern with growth
management, environmental protection, and the provision of lowincome housing have added new dimensions to the planning process
and have imparted an urgency to local comprehensive planning that
was not felt earlier. These concerns are reflected in federal legislation mandating comprehensive planning in federal grant-in-aid3 and
environmental programs,4 in state legislation mandating such plan* Howard A. Stamper Professor of Law and Director of Urban Studies, School
of Law, Washington University (St. Louis). B.A. 1947, LL.B. 1949, Univ. of
Wisconsin; J.S.D. 1956, Yale.-Ed.
The author especially wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Randall W. Scott,
Chief Research Attorney for the Advisory Commission, as well as other staff
members of the Commission for their helpful comments and suggestions. Extensive
research assistance was provided by Gayle Crose, Gerald P. Greiman, and Deborah
B. Wafer, law students at Washington University School of Law.
t This article is a revised version of a paper prepared in 1975 by the author as a
consultant to the Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth of the
American Bar Association. The paper, submitted for the consideration of the
Advisory Commission, contains the opinions and views of the author and not
necessarily those of the advisory commission or of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, which funded this project.
1. This legislation generally followed the language proposed in the Standard
Planning Enabling Act. See text at notes 7-18 infra. For an early example, see Act
of May 4, 1927, No. 336, art. XI, § 1149, [1927] Pa. Laws 519 (repealed 1966).
2. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970).
4. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464
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ning by local governments, 5 and in an increasing willingness of the
courts to attach greater significance to the comprehensive plan. 6
This article will deal with the enlarged role of the comprehensive
plan in the local land use control process. Part I examines traditional
judicial views of the role of the comprehensive plan as a guide to
zoning administration. Part II suggests that innovations in land use
control and comprehensive planning techniques evidence a need for
mandatory planning. Subsequent sections examine changes in the
judicial attitude toward the role of the comprehensive plan in land use
control administration, and survey some enacted and proposed state
legislation that modifies the early planning acts by requiring comprehensive planning. This legislation is analyzed to determine what
elements are essential to the mandatory planning process, how they
should be enunciated in statutory form, and how the requirement that
land use control administration be consistent with the comprehensive
plan should be legislatively expressed and legally enforced.

I.

THE

TRADITIONAL

Vmw

OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AS A

GUIDE TO LoCAL ZoNING CONTROLS

In most states, the present statutory basis for local comprehensive
planning and land use controls can be traced to model legislation first
proposed by the United States Department of Commerce in the late
1920s. Two major model acts were issued: the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act, 7 containing statutory authority for planning
and subdivision control, and the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, 8 containing statutory authority for zoning.9 It is not clear
whether these acts were intended to require that zoning be consistent
(Supp. 1974); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp.
1974).
5. See note 222 infra. See also text at notes 205-62 infra.
6. See text at notes 87-204 infra.
7. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1928).
8. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr (U.S. Dept. of Commerce rev. ed.
1926).
9. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act was the more successful of the two
model acts and is still in effect, with various modifications, in 47 states. See 1 N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 18.01 (1974). There were few regularly
established city departments dealing with planning for private land use at the time the
standard acts were drafted; consequently, city administrators moved directly to the
drafting and enforcement of zoning ordinances without the benefit of comprehensive
general plans. Apparently the resulting pressure for state statutory authority to
validate the local zoning process led to the decision to draft the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act first, although logically the Standard City Planning Enabling Act
should have been given prior attention. See T. KENT, THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN 3143 (1964). See also M. SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 242-48
(1969).
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with a comprehensive plan prepared and adopted independently of
the zoning ordinance. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act did
contain enigmatic language stating simply that zoning "shall be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan."10 It can be argued that
these words impose such a requirement and that a literal application
of this language might have banned zoning in the absence of a comprehensive plan. But this interpretation presents two difficulties.
First, since the Zoning Enabling Act was drafted before the planning
act, there was at the time of its issuance no statutory planning process to which zoning could be related. 11 Second, when the Planning
Enabling Act was finally proposed, it made local planning optional. 12
Notes appended to the standard zoning act also indicate that the
draftsmen did not contemplate an independently adopted comprehensive plan. The footnotes state that the "in accordance" requirement
"will prevent haphazard or piecemeal zoning. No zoning should be
done without such a comprehensive study."13 This comment suggests that zoning was to be undertaken on the basis of a comprehensive review of local conditions, not that the preparation of an independent comprehensive plan was intended as a condition to the exercise of the zoning power.
The provisions of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act that
define the content and role of the comprehensive plan tend to reinforce this interpretation. Early city planning concentrated on local
capital improvement programs,14 and this influence is reflected in the
section of the Act that defines the comprehensive plan's contents. 1G
This section can conveniently be divided into two parts, the first of
which required that the plan include recommendations for the "development" of the "territory" covered by the plan and which listed plan
elements. Though the list was expressly not meant to be exhaustive, .
the elements that it did enumerate related exclusively to recommendations for public capital facilities, streets, and open spaces. The
10. STANDARD STATE ZoNING ENABLING Acr § 3 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce rev.
ed. 1926).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 2 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce
1928).
13. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr § 3, n.22 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce
rev. ed. 1926).
14. See Johnson, Preface, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 198 (1965).
15. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 6 (U.S. Dept of Commerce
1928). This definition was provided even though the draftsmen stated in a footnote
to the act that no definition of the plan was thought necessary. Id. at § 6, n.32. The
draftsmen were apparently divided on this point. See T. KENT, supra note 9, at 4546. However, the section of the act expressing the purposes of the plan is not limited
to planning for public facilities. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 9 (U.S.
Dept of Commerce 1928).
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second part required the inclusion of a "zoning plan," which, though
not defined, was clearly intended to cover land uses. The explanatory notes can be construed as containing contradictory statements
concerning the form of the zoning plan. 16 These notes do not clarify
the exact relationship between the zoning and comprehensive plans,
but leave a distinct impression that the zoning plan is a separate
document from that part of the comprehensive plan covering public
facilities. This interpretation suggests that, if the zoning act's "in
accordance" language required an independently prepared plan, it
was to be fulfilled by the zoning plan of the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act, not by the part of the comprehensive plan that was
defined to cover public facilities.
Other features of the standard planning act also suggest that the
"in accordance" language of the zoning act was not understood to
require reference to some "master plan." Consistent with its apparent distinction between a zoning plan and the part of the comprehensive plan covering public facilities, the planning act implies that a
"master plan" be taken into account only to the extent that it governs
the construction of these facilities. 17 In addition, even in this regard
the plan is only advisory. While public facility construction may be
carried out only after planning commission review, commission disapproval can be overriden by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership
of the governing body. 18 If the "comprehensive plan" was to be only
advisory, and to relate only to public facilities, it is unlikely that the
drafters intended that the courts look to it as binding authority on the
validity of zoning.
One exception to the advisory status of the comprehensive plan
does appear in the subdivision control provisions of the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act. Planning commission approval of subdivision plats prior to filing or recording is contingent on the adoption
of a "major street plan. " 10 The street plan that is contemplated is
clearly an element of the comprehensive plan covering public facilities, and is not part of the zoning plan that was also contemplated
16. See STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 6 n.31, n.36, n.38. The
contradiction arises because explanatory note 38 implies strongly that the zoning plan
is to be included as part of the general plan; notes 31 and 36 contain emphatic
language that the general plan must remain general and not include the intricacies of
a zoning plan.
17. See STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 9 (U.S. Dept of Commerce
1928).
18. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 9 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce
1928).
19. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 13 (U.S. Dept of Commerce
1928).
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by the planning act. 20 Thus the planning and zoning acts fail to define the zoning plan and leave its relationship to the zoning process
unclear.
The early judicial interpretations of the statutes almost uniformly
accepted a narrow reading that the "comprehensive plan" with which
zoning must be "in accordance" could be found within the text of the
zoning ordinance. 21 Perhaps the leading case expressing this "unitary view" is Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 22 a 1957 decision
20. See text at notes 16-18 supra. State legislation has not always followed the
Standard City Planning Enabling Act on this point. See generally, R. YEARWOOD,
LAND SUBDMSION REGULATION: POLICY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR URBAN
Pl.ANNING (1971); Nelson, The Master Plan and Subdivision Control, 16 ME. L. REV.
107 (1964).
21. The history of judicial interpretation is discussed in Sullivan and Kresse],
Twenty Years After-Renewed Significance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement,
9 URBAN L. ANN. 33 (1975). There is a growing body of literature discussing the
rote of the comprehensive plan in land use controls. An early and widely cited
article is Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955). See Bernard, The Comprehensive Plan as a Basis for Legal Reform, 44 J.
URBAN L. 611 (1967); Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955); Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and
Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 183 (1972); Plager, The
Planning/Land Use Control Relationship, 3 LAND USE CONTROLS Q. 26 (1969);
Tarlock, Consistency with Adopted Land Use Plans as a Standard of Judicial
Review: The Case Against, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 69 (1975); Note, Comprehensive Land
Use Plans and the Consistency Requirement, 2 FLA. STATE L. REV. 766 (1974);
Comment, Zoning Shall Be Consistent With the General Plan-A Help or a Hindrance
to Planning?, 10 SAN DIEGO L REV. 901 (1973); Note, Comprehensive Plan
Requirement in Zoning, 12 SYR. L. REV. 342 (1961). For additional commentary by
, a land use planner, see Raymond, How Effective the Master Plan?, 2 J. ENVIRONMENT SYSTEMS 225 (1972). A general review of policy-making through the
planning process is presented in Berry, The Question of Policy Altematives, in THE
GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA 155 (C. Harriss ed. 1974).
Professor Tarlock's article presents a carefully reasoned case against both mandatory planning and the requirement that land use controls be consistent with an
adopted plan. His argument has its origins in Pareto-based theories of property rights
and property regulation, which prefer privately-negotiated means for resolving land
use conflicts. These theories in tum are based on cost-free assumptions about the
bargaining and negotiation process-assumptions that many urban economists view
as tautological, if not unreal. Interview with Charles L. Leven, then Director of the
Washington University Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, June 15, 1975. On
the other hand, equally tautological assumptions, e.g., that public decision-makers
possess all needed data and can be expected to make optimal public policy decisions,
could be constructed to "support" virtually unrestricted public planning and land use
regulation. Professor Tarlock has also published a fascinating account of an attempt
to implement a comprehensive planning policy for shopping center development.
Tarlock, Not in Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan: A Case Study of Regional
Shopping Center Conflicts in Lexington, Kentucky, 1970 URBAN L. ANN. 133.
For additional criticisms of the marketplace approach to land development controls, see Costonis, "Fair'' Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 1021, 102633 (1975); Oxley, Economic Theory and Urban Planning, 1 ENVIRON. & PLANNING
497 (1975).
22. 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957). See Furtney v. Zoning Commn., 159 Conn.
585, 271 A.2d 319 (1970); Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 266 Md.
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of the New Jersey supreme court. The New Jersey zoning enabling
legislation had incorporated the "in accordance" language of the
standard act, 23 but no independent comprehensive plan had been
prepared or adopted by the township. Plaintiff argued that a zoning
amendment was therefore ultra vires since the statutory requirements
had not been met. The court upheld the amendment, reasoning that
the history of planning and zoning legislation in the state indicated
that no comprehensive plan external to the zoning ordinance was
required. 24
New Jersey had followed the pattern of the standard enabling
legislation and had adopted its zoning act prior to its planning act.
This history led the court to conclude that the zoning act did not
require a comprehensive plan "in some physical form" outside the
zoning ordinance. 25 Having rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of
the "in accordance" requirement, the court supplied its own. Relying on early zoning cases, the court found that the intent of the act
was to prevent a "capricious exercise" of the zoning power, and tlius
read a test of fairness and reasonableness into the statute. Without
supplying an "exact definition" of "in accordance," the court noted
that " 'plan' connotes an integrated product of a rational process and
'comprehensive' requires something beyond a piecemeal approach,
both to be revealed by the ordinance considered in relation to the
339, 292 A.2d 680 (1972); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968); Ward v. Montgomery Twp., 28 N.J. 529, 147 A.2d 248 (1959);
Allred v. City of Raleigh, 7 N.C. App. 602, 173 S.E.2d 533 (1970), revd. on other
grounds, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414
Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); Hadley v. Harold Realty Co., 97 R.I. 403, 198 A.2d
149 (1964). See N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 435-38.
In Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 28, 35, 435 P.2d 949, 953 (1968), the
court stated that a comprehensive zoning regulation may evidence and constitute a
comprehensive zoning plan. However, "since [the comprehensive plan] usually
proposes rather than disposes, it does not ordinarily, without further regulatory
implementation, in and by itself, impose any immediate restrictions . . . [but] forms
a blueprint for the various regulatory measures it suggests." Later Washington cases
have picked up on Shelton's "blueprint" theory. See State ex rel. Standard Mining &
Dev. Corp. v. City of Auburn, 82 Wash. 2d 321, 510 P.2d 647 (1973); Buell v. City
of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Gerla v. City of Tacoma, 12
Wash. App. 883, 533 P.2d 416 (1975); Sharninghouse v. City of Bellingham, 4 Wash.
App. 198, 480 P.2d 233 (1971). See also County Commrs. v. Edmonds, 240 Md.
680, 215 A.2d 209 (1965) (holding that master plan recommending uses different
from those permitted in existing zoning ordinance did not give rise to presumption of
change in conditions or mistake sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness
accorded the original zoning ordinance); text at note 177 infra. Cases taking the
traditional unitary view may nonetheless rely on the policies of an adopted comprehensive plan to support their decision. See, e.g., First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Plan
& Zoning Commn., 165 Conn. 533, 338 A.2d 490 (1973).
23. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 40:$5-32 (1967).
24. 24 N.J. at 164-66, 131 A.2d at 6-8.
25. 24 N.J. at 165-66, 131 A.2d at 7.
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physical facts and the [statutory] purposes .
"26 This reading
of the statute does establish that departure from a "rational process"
is a basis for a claim of improperly selective treatment in the zoning
amendment process, and thereby provides some protection against
arbitrarily adopted zoning amendments. Nevertheless, it effectively
rejects the view that independent comprehensive planning is required
by the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act.
Concern for a more explicit planning base for the zoning process
did not, however, entirely disappear after Kozesnik and similar decisions. 27 It was evidenced in Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 28
in which the Pennsylvania supreme court considered the validity of a
township's floating limited industrial zone. As with most floating
zone ordinances, the zoning text amendment that authorized the
floating zone was adopted before specific designation of such districts
on the township's zoning map, and provided both explicit controls
over the industrial uses allowable in the zone and detailed site restrictions. Landowners were authorized to apply to the township's governing body for map amendments placing their property in the floating zone. 29 Prior to the enactment of the ordinance, the township
had engaged in some planning studies, but it had not adopted a
comprehensive plan. In an opinion with a somewhat confused rationale, the court invalidated the ordinance as a violation of the "in
accordance" requirement.
It is not clear from the opinion whether the court would have
validated the township's floating zone procedure had there been a
separate comprehensive plan. This confusion is produced in part by
the court's apparent unease over the floating zone technique itself.
Early in the opinion, the court quoted the observation of an earlier
decision that " '[z]oning is the legislative division of a community
26. 24 N.J. at 166, 131 A.2d at 7.
27. The Kozesnik opinion recently has been followed in Oklahoma, Tulsa Rock
Co. v. Board of County Commrs., 531 P.2d 351 (Okla. App. 1974), and reaffirmed in
New Jersey, Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 307
A.2d 563 (1973); Garden State Farms, Inc., v. Bay II, 136 N.J. Super. 1, 343 A.2d
832 (1975).
However, recently passed New Jersey legislation appears to alter the interpretation of Kozesnik by referring to a land use plan element of a master plan and stating that, "all of the provisions of such zoning ordinance or any amendment or revision thereto shall either be substantially consistent with the land use plan element
of the master plan or designed to effectuate such plan element." N.J. Public Laws
1975, c. 291, § 49 (1976). This statement is tempered by a following provision that
allows the governing body to disregard the consistency requirement if acting by majority vote and with the reasons stated in the record.
28. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). Cf. Sheridan v. Planning Bd., 159 Conn. 1,
19, 266 A.2d 396, 405 (1969).
29. 401 Pa. at 213-14, 164 A.2d at 9.
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into areas in each of which only certain designated uses of land are
permitted so that the community may develop in an orderly manner
in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' " 30 This quotation suggests that the primary reason for the invalidation of the ordinance
may have been its departure from the zoning district system, a
holding that might hamper use of the floating zone, but does not
specifically relate to the comprehensive plan requirement. Elsewhere
in the opinion, however, the court criticized the township's planning
process81 for having devised only the "rudiments" that must enter into
a comprehensive plan, and for thus failing to satisfy the statutory
requirement. The court seemed to indicate that complete fulfillment
could be achieved only if the township explicitly defined the planning
policies that apply to individual developments in a comprehensive
plan external to the zoning ordinance.
If the Eves court did intend to prohibit floating zones as being
unauthorized by the "in accordance" requirement, the decision's authority has been placed in question by subsequent Pennsylvania statutes32 and case law. 33 This reading of Eves is still valuable as an
example of how courts might invalidate zoning techniques that appear to allow too much administrative discretion, but few courts have
followed Eves in this direction. Moreover, a growing body of legislation specifically authorizes planned unit development and similar
administrative controls, 34 and the American Law Institute's (ALI)
30. 401 Pa. at 215, 164 A.2d at 9, quoting Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393
Pa. 106, 110, 141 A.2d 606, 609 (1958).
31. 401 Pa. at 219, 164 A.2d at 11.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, § 10606 (1972). See also Krasnowiecki, Zoning
Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1972). If
this requirement is not met, one Pennsylvania court would shift to the municipality
the burden of proving the relevance of the zoning ordinance to community development objectives. See Nichols v. State College Borough, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P.
1971). The court also held that the statute mandated the preparation of a comprehensive plan. For the pertinent statutory language, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
10209.l(a)(l), 10301.
33. See Russell v. Pennsylvania Twp. Planning Commn., _ Pa. Commnw. - ,
348 A.2d 499 (1975) (noting that subsequent cases have eliminated the Eves comprehensive plan mandate); Raum v. Board of Supervisors,_ Pa. Commnw. - , 342
A.2d 450 (1975); Marino v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Commnw. 116, 274 A.2d 221
(1971). But cf. Appeal of Key Realty Co., 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962). See
also Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory
and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 67-71 (1965).
34. See Bangs, PUD in Practice: The State and Local Legislative Response, in
FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 23, 25-29 (R. Burchell ed. 1973 ). Much
of this state legislation is based on a model act prepared by the Urban Land Institute.
See R. BABCOCK, D. McBRIDE & J. KRASNOWIECKJ, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED
UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT pt. II, at 65-83, 84-94 (Urban Land Inst., Tech.
Bull. No. 52, 1965). For an example of state legislation based on the model act,
see N.J. STAT• .ANN. § 40:55-54 to -67 (1967).
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Model Land Development Code would permit a wide variety of
administrative zoning procedures at the local level. 35 Thus the real
vitality of Eves lies in its refusal to uphold an administrative zoning
technique absent an independently adopted comprehensive plan. Eves
reveals that the Kozesnik interpretation of the "in accordance" requirement, which finds the required plan in a rationally considered
zoning ordinance, is simply not possible when the district concept is
abandoned and heavily discretionary techniques are substituted. As
local zoning practice increasingly employs administrative techniques,
courts may be moved to reexamine the continuing feasibility of the
Kozesnik approach itself.
Nevertheless, Kozesnik still represents the prevailing interpretation of the "in accordance" requirement. Though this interpretation
severely restricted the role of the comprehensive plan as a guide to
local zoning, it may have been the correct statutory construction in
view of the fact that the Standard City Planning Enabling Act made
local comprehensive planning optional. This interpretation makes
the power to zone available to all municipalities, whether or not they
have elected to advance an independent comprehensive plan.
While Kozesnik and Eves considered challenges to zoning ordinances on statutory grounds, the "in accordance" requirement may
also be relevant when zoning restrictions are attacked on constitutional grounds. Two constitutional challenges to zoning ordinances
can be mounted, each of which may raise questions concerning the
weight a court should accord to the comprehensive plan. The classic
challenge to a zoning restriction is that it violates both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the fifth amendment's
prohibition against governmental "taking" of private property without just compensation, or similar clauses in state constitutions. 36 The
courts apply several tests to determine whether a "taking" has occurred, one of which focuses exclusively on the effect of the restriction and finds a "taking" only if no reasonable use of the property
remains. 37 The court may therefore ignore the broader community
35. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 2 (1975).
36. In this situation, the landowner will allege that the zoning ordinance appropriates his right to use his land and thereby constitutes a "taking" without due process of
law. See, e.g., Krause v. City of Royal Oak, 11 Mich. App. 183, 160 N.W.2d 769
(1968).
37. This variant is the "diminution of value" test. Other "taking" approaches
have been categorized by several commentators to include (1) the noxious use or
nuisance abatement test, (2) balancing theory, and (3) the physical invasion test.
See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Basis of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1967); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 14 YALE LJ. 36, 38 (1964); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALI1Y, ANN. REP. 126-34 (1973).
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planning policies that underlay the restriction. Other "taking" tests
look to whether a severe restriction serves a reasonable or necessary
public purpose, such as the abatement of nuisance-like uses. 38
The second constitutional challenge, based on federal and state
equal protection clauses, may require a more direct scrutiny of local
planning policies and procedures. Suit may be brought on this
ground by a landowner who feels that his property has been more
harshly restricted than that of other, similarly situated, landowners.39
Perhaps more frequently, a neighborhood association or a neighboring landowner challenges "spot zoning" 40 of a single property or
small area that permits a more intensive use than that permitted on surrounding properties. 41 In such cases, the court must focus
on the reasons for the zoning classification, and the classification
must be justified by policies applicable to the whole community. The
court, therefore, is more likely to rely on a comprehensive plan as the
basis for these policies, although its willingness to draw on the plan to
resolve disputes will depend on whether the plan fairly represents
duly considered local policies and on whether the zoning ordinance
faithfully implements the policies of the plan. Thus, the "in accordance" requirement may be important in challenges to zoning ordinances based on constitutional as well as statutory grounds.

JI.

A

MANDATORY PLANNING REQUIREMENT FOR
LoCAL GOVERNMENT

Time has revealed that the decision of the model planning act
draftsmen to make the planning function optional was as serious a
38. The balancing theory and the noxious use test refuse to find a "taking" when
the public purpose to be achieved justifies the regulation, even though its effect on the
landowner may be severe. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
595 (1962) (employing these tests when the municipality passed an ordinance
prohibiting the further excavations of a gravel pit located in a residential area);
Consolidated Rock Products Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d
342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (appearing to take the
balancing approach in prohibiting the extraction and quarrying of rock products).
39. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d
166 (1957) (in which plaintiffs alleged discriminatory classification as similar land
across the street was in a different zone); D. MANDELXER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 711 (1971). See also text at notes 92-129 infra.
40. See generally text at notes 130-83 infra. A "spot zoning" challenge may
arise either under the equal protection clause or the enabling statute. The court
apparently considered a "spot zoning" claim based on the enabling statute in
Kozesnik, 24 N.J. at 172-73, 131 A.2d at 10-11.
41. See, e.g., Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 161, 458 P.2d 405
(1969) (neighboring landowners challenging a single multi-family use zoning
change). See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, at 70-84. In suits brought by such
third parties, standing often becomes a critical issue. See Douglaston Civic Assn. v.
Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974) (taking an expansive
view of standing for neighborhood associations).
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shortcoming as their more widely recognized failure to call explicitly
for a comprehensive plan in zoning administration. Whatever reasons for the absence of a planning requirement there may have been,
it is now apparent that changes in land use control techniques, expansion in the scope of comprehensive planning, and an increasing
emphasis on mandatory planning in federal aid programs all underscore the need for mandating a comprehensive planning process at
the local government level.
A.

Changes in the Land Use Control Process

An augmented planning role is called for by changes that have
occurred in the land use control process. Under the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, the assumption always had been that land
uses within communities would be allocated to mapped zoning districts in advance of development. Development would then occur as
a matter of right wherever it was consistent with the permitted,
mapped uses. 42 This assumption has become less warranted as communities have increasingly formulated land use policy through the
zoning amendment process and discretionary zoning techniques. Local zoning ordinances are now often framed to require a legislative
change in the zoning map before significant new development can
proceed. Most developable land is assigned a low-intensity land
use classification meant to deter development until rezoning is
requested to accommodate a specific project. In some cases, the
existing mapped zoning classifications may be extended to the area to
permit the desired development. Alternatively, the zoning ordinance
may only contain the text applicable to a floating zone or planned
unit developments district, and these districts are then located on tlie
map on a case-by-case basis. 43 As the Eves court recognized, under
a system in which the zoning text and map are not meant to indicate
future land use patterns, it is difficult to read the "in accordance"
language out of the enabling act by arguing that the plan is to be
found within the zoning ordinance. 44

B.

The Changing Scope of Comprehensive Planning

Changes in the scope of comprehensive land use planning also
warrant a mandatory planning requirement at the local level. The
42. See U.S. NATL. COMMN. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, REPORT OF TIIE NATL.
COMMN. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING TIIE AMERICAN CllY 203-04 (1969)
[hereinafter 1969 REPORT].
43. See F. So, D. MOSENA & F. BANGS, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT OR•
9-10 (Planning Advisory Service Rep. No. 291, 1973).
44. See text at notes 28-35 supra.

DINANCES
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historic focus of this planning on the relation of land uses to existing
and projected capital facilities 45 is broadening in response to new
pressures. 46 In environmental and growth control programs,47 there
is a need for local planning policies that will direct and contain new
development in order to minimize environmental damage and maximize the use of existing and planned public service facilities. These
policies may restrict growth in certain areas of the community, such
as wetlands and flood plains, while encouraging new growth at
locations where environmental damage is not so likely to occur.
Higher densities may also be proposed at locations where new development is allowed, in order to minimize encroachment on agricultural
and environmental resource areas. Mandatory comprehensive planning is sorely needed to rationalize public decisions to restrict or
intensify development, so that a proper balance can be struck between
the needs of the public and the desires of landowners affected by
these decisions.
Environmental and fiscal considerations have also prompted
many communities to adopt managed growth programs. These programs seek to direct growth to preferred sections of the community,
usually in step with the provision of needed public services, and may
seek as well to phase growth over ·a period of years or to limit the
amount of community growth. Fairness in treatment is particularly
important whenever managed growth programs include a timing
element. As did the New York court of appeals in Golden v.
Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo, 48 courts may reasonably
require as a condition to these programs that a plan exist for the
orderly provision of capital facilities, so that development will not be
capriciously deferred on the ground that public facilities are not
available. Comprehensive planning is also necessary because of the
careful orchestration of community regulatory and public service
programs that growth management requires. Both zoning and subdivision control ordinances may be employed in a managed growth
program, and these in turn will be linked to community capital
facility programming. An adequate planning base is needed if these
various programs and regulatory ordinances are to be administered
cohesively in furtherance of common policy objectives.
Planning programs must also direct increased attention to low45. See text at notes 1 and 15-16 supra.
46. See text at notes 2-6 supra.
41. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
48. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
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income housing needs. Land use planning long lacked any coordination with planning for low-income housing, an omission due in part to
the absence of public subsidies for such housing. Before the passage
of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,40 public assistance was available only for publicly owned housing, and during most
of the postwar years public housing was funded by the federal government at minimum support levels. 50 The provision of federal
subsidies for privately built low-income housing in the 1968 Act
created a new awareness of the need for planning to make decisions
about the location and availability of .subsidized housing. While the
subsequent elimination of the 1968 subsidies for private developersi;1
reduced the pressure on planning programs to be sensitive to lowincome housing needs, the availability of some federal subsidies for
privately built housing through the leased public housing program of
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974r;2 has once
more brought attention to the role of planning in the low-income
housing area. 53
Traditional planning programs usually have been conducted at
the local level, and local governments generally have been hostile to
the introduction of low-income housing into their communities. Many
regional planning agencies have therefore attempted to meet lowincome housing needs by adopting fair share housing plans54 that
estimate low-income housing requirements and provide criteria for
the distribution of this housing. 55 Although these plans deserve to be
49. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
50. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 116-19 (1968).
51. Housing Subsidies to private developers under the 1968 Act provided for
mortgage subsidy payments both to developers of multi-family housing and to owneroccupants of single family housing. While the multi-family housing subsidies have
been terminated, HUD does intend to use remaining unobligated funds for single
family dwellings in a new and somewhat revised housing subsidy program. See 41
Fed. Reg. 1168 (1976). Congress may yet act to extend this program.
52. 42 u.s.c. § 1437f (Supp. 1974).
53. For example, communities receiving federal ·assistance under the 1974 Act
must prepare housing assistance plans that indicate local low-income housing needs
and the general location of sites for such housing. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp.
1974). The federal statute authorizing federal assistance for state, regional, and local
planning also requires that any plans funded under its provisions must contain a
housing element indicating how the plan will meet regional housing needs. 40 U.S.C.
§ 461(c)(l) (Supp. 1974).
54. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY·
MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS pt. V (1974). Fair share housing
plans have been adopted in such widely diverse areas as Miami County (Dayton),
Ohio, Miami, Florida, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.
55. Fair share plans vary in the criteria they use to make these regional housing
allocations. Most are explicitly or implicitly based on a low-income housing dispersal
policy, but the plans vary the basis by which dispersal should occur. Some fair
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included as an important element in regional planning programs, they
are not always well-integrated into the comprehensive regional plan.
Moreover, they face an uncertain future under recent federal community development and housing legislation. 56 Perhaps the basic difficulty is that few states have as yet responded to this need by amending their enabling legislation to require housing elements in both local
and regional plans. 57
As a result of these newer substantive concerns, planners are
being forced to make judgments about land development opportunities that have an increasing effect on the land market. Environmental and growth control programs in particular have a substantial
impact on where development will occur. Plans that attempt to
improve the availability of housing may conflict with environmental
and growth control objectives. 58 Growth controls that limit the
accessibility of land. for development on the basis of local service
inadequacies may unduly restrict the amount of land available for
development, and the resulting land scarcities may in tum inflate land
prices so that housing opportunities are restricted. 59 Comprehensive
share plans are based on a proportionate responsibility approach that assigns a fair
share of low-income housing as determined by both the local performance in meeting
low-income housing needs and the adequacy of local school and other public services
to support the additional housing. Other plans are based more explicitly on community and neighborhood planning considerations and attempt _to relate a low-income
housing policy to more general policies for neighborhood improvement and community growth. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 54, pt. V.
56. Low-income needs are not ignored by the 1974 housing act, however, since
cities and urban counties applying for community development funds under that act
are required to prepare housing assistance plans that show the "general location" of
housing for low-income persons. The housing assistance plan is intended to provide a
"greater choice in housing opportunities," and is explicitly based on a policy of
dispersing low-income housing developments. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. 1974).
While the impact of the housing assistance plan on regional fair share housing
plans is not yet clear, and though the housing assistance plans are prepared by cities
and counties participating in the federal community development program, the
federally required housing assistance plan can be expected to maintain local and
regional interest in housing planning strategies.
57. Notable exceptions include California, see California Local Planning Act,
CAL. GoVT. CooE § 65302(c) (West 1974), and Florida, see Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(6)(f)
(Supp. 1975) (requiring that the housing element in local plans make "provision of
adequate sites for future housing including housing for low and moderate income
families and mobile homes .••").
58. "Although zoning must include schemes designed to allow municipalities to
more effectively contend with the increased demands of evolving and growing
communities, under its guise, townships have been wont to try their hand at an array
of exclusionary devices in the hope of avoiding the very burden which growth must
inevitably bring. . . ." Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 285
N.E.2d 291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149-50, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
59. See E. BERGMAN, ExrERNAL VALIDITY OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON
DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS AND HOUSING COSTS 20-29 (1974).
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planning must allocate available land among these mutually exclusive,
competing uses.
To the extent that the planning process can successfully make
these choices, it may also forestall due process "taking" objections to
land use restrictions that are adopted in furtherance of the plan. Due
process objections arise because implementation of a particular land
use strategy may inflict capital "losses" on landowners whose development opportunities have been restricted. The price landowners paid
for their land may have reflected either the development allowed on
the property when they bought it or the development they expected
the community to permit, given its prior zoning record. If new
restrictions are imposed suddenly, with little notice, and not in accordance with a comprehensive planning policy, the market will not
have an adequate opportunity to adapt. 60 Landowners' expectations
will be frustrated and due process challenges to the zoning will result.
For example, a community may rezone land from high to lower
residential density, usually to further a growth restriction policy requiring a downward revision of expected development levels. Although a landowner technically has no vested property right in an
existing zoning classification as applied to his undeveloped land, the
courts have shown increasing hostility to piecemeal downzonings not
carried out as part of a comprehensive rezoning process. 61
The problem created for the land market by erratic zoning change
can to some extent be avoided. When community policies for new
growth and development are both comprehensive and prospective, the
market can internalize any restrictions that have been imposed. Land
purchases at premium prices in restricted areas can then be viewed as
a form of speculation against the system, and the inflated price paid
for these lands discounted in any appraisal of the validity of the
restriction. 62 While mandatory comprehensive planning will not
60. For an analysis of the role of the comprehensive plan in dealing with
uncertainties in the land use control process, see Haar, The Master Plan: An Inquiry
in Dialogue Form, in C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 745 (2d ed. 1971). Haar's
position is criticized in Tarlock, supra note 21, at 86-87.
61. Compare Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 202
S.E.2d 889 (1974) (invalidating zoning ordinance which allowed piecemeal downzoning inconsistent with comprehensive plan), with Norbeck Village Joint Venture v.
Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969) (upholding comprehensive downzoning consistent with master plan). See also Arastra Ltd. Partnership
v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (awarding damages in
inverse condemnation for a downzoning enacted by the city to prevent development
on plaintifrs land pending its acquisition as public open space).
62. See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 520-22, 542 P.2d 237, 24547, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 373-75 (1975). On the other hand, the landowner who buys
in reliance on established planning policies might claim constitutional protection
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avoid all due process problems in land use regulation, 63 it may reduce
the likelihood that purchasers of land will eventually find themselves
in situations in which they believe that land development restrictions
on uses and densities have unconstitutionally deprived them of the
ability to recapture their investment.

C.

Mandatory Federally Required Planning
and the New Regionalism

Mandatory planning is also needed to impart a regional perspective to local land use policies. Housing markets are regional in scope,
and low-income fair share housing plans have usually been executed
on a regional scale. Growth control programs must also have a
regional focus, for no community can reasonably plan to control
growth without taking into account the development policies of its
neighbors. Air and water pollution likewise are regional phenomena
and require solutions that embrace more than a single community.
The necessarily regional focus of these land development policies
will create problems if planning is not made mandatory throughout
the region. If only some communities have based their land use
controls on policies developed through comprehensive planning, the
beneficial effects of such planning will be diluted. Moreover, some
areas of the regional land market will be subject to comprehensively
based land use controls and some will not. This situation could well
create inequities among landowners and could cause substantial instability in the regional land market.
While some states have, by legislation, established effective regional planning agencies, 64 the need for regional planning has primarily been recognized at the federal level. Congress has responded
by mandating regional planning as a prerequisite to participation in a
variety of federally funded land development and capital facility
when these policies are changed. These problems have surfaced to some extent in the
downzoning cases. See generally Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401
F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
63. This argument is not intended as an ad hominem approach to constitutional
issues in land use regulation. No inference is intended that the constitutional position
of the landowner is dependent on his speculative intent, although the cases are not
without such suggestions. See American Natl. Bank & Trust Co., v. City of Highland
Park, 29 Ill. App. 3d 878, 881-82, 331 N.E.2d 597, 600 (1975); Krause v. City of
Royal Oak, 11 Mich. App. 183, 189, 160 N.W.2d 769, 772 (1968).
64. One of the most effective of these regional agencies is the Metropolitan
Council that has been established in the Twin Cities area of Minnesota. See S.
BALDINGER, PLANNING AND GOVERNING THE METROPOLIS (1971). For an analysis of
the operation of another successful agency, see Booth, The Adirondack Park Agency
Act: A Challenge in Regional Land Use Planning, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 612
(1975).
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programs. 65 The ad hoc development of regional planning agencies
in response to this federal stimulus had made evident a need for the
state to provide a coherent legislative base for regional planning.
Extensive regional planning is required by such diverse federal
legislation as the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 66 the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972. 67 Regional transportation planning under the Highway Act,
which has now been extended to include planning for public transit, 68
is a condition for federal acceptance of state projects in the federal-aid
system. It has been required since 1965 and must be carried out in
all metropolitan areas with populations of 50,000 or more. 00
National air and water quality legislation has increasingly called
for strengthened regional planning to implement national pollution
abatement goals. A regional waste quality planning process is
mandated by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act for urban areas
having serious water quality problems. 10 This planning process is
intended to provide a basis for the award of federal grants for waste
treatment plants, but includes the preparation of a regional land use
policy as it relates to water quality goals. The program also requires
that limited land use control powers be delegated to a regional agency
authorized to prevent the installation of any new "facilities" that
would violate the plan. 71
No explicit planning process in the conventional sense is dictated
by the National Clean Air Act of 1970. 72 This legislation only
mandates that state implementation plans specify strategies for the
attainment and maintenance of national air quality standards through
the application of a variety of enforcement techniques, loosely characterized by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a
"control strategy." 73 Nevertheless, the Clean Air Act has been inter65. See notes 66-69 infra.
66. 23 u.s.c. § 134 (1970).
61. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. 1974);
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. 1974).
68. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1970); see also 23 U.S.C. § 142 (Supp. 1974).
69. 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. 1974).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1974).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (Supp. 1974). See Mandelker & Rothschild, The Role of
Land-Use Controls in Combating Air Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3
EcoLOGY L.Q. 235 (1973).
73. 40 C.F.R. § 51.l(n) (1975). State implementation plans may contain such
land use and transportation controls "as may be necessary" to attain and maintain
national air quality standards, but there is no planning basis for these controls other
than the state implementation plan which is required by the federal law. See 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (B) (Supp. 1974).
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preted by the EPA to require extensive regional planning, including
land use planning,74 to ensure the maintenance of air quality once
the national standards have been achieved. 75
Another federal statute that calls for a regional planning program
is the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.76 Coastal states and
territories receiving federal financial assistance under this legislation
must prepare and adopt a coastal zone management program, which
is to include all of the elements of comprehensive planning. 77 While
the impact of this legislation in any state may be modest if the coastal
zone is narrowly drawn, the zone may be broadly defined and assume
regional dimensions.
This growing array of federal planning requirements has led to
demands that the various programs be better coordinated. 78 The
need for coordination is especially acute because the land use planning required in the environmental programs emphasizes such goals
as air and water quality at the expense of more comprehensive
planning objectives. The planning assistance program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)79 may promote
rationalization of federal requirements by providing financial aid to
participating state, regional, and local planning agencies. Assistance
is conditional upon the preparation of housing and land use plans that
encompass regional housing needs and growth management objectives;80 it thus provides a broader conceptual base for the planning
process than do the other, functionally oriented, federal planning
assistance programs. In addition, the federal agencies supervising
the various programs are increasingly utilizing inter-agency agreements to coordinate related federal planning requirements. 81 Never74. See 3 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR
AIR QUALITY MAINTENANCE PLANNING AND ANALYSIS (1974).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1975).
76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. 1974). See Mandelker & Sherry, The
National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 1 URBAN L. ANN. 119 (1974).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (Supp. 1974).
78. This issue surfaced in recent congressional hearings held to consider the Land
Use and Resource Conservation Act of 1975. See Hearings on H.R. 3510 and
Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 94-7, at 458-67
(1975) (statement of Eliot R. Cutler, General Counsel and Director of Government
Affairs, International Council of Shopping Centers).
79. 40 U.S.C. § 461(b) (Supp. 1974).
80. 40 U.S.C. § 461(c) (Supp. 1974).
81. One such agreement was executed between HUD and EPA in order to
coordinate water quality planning with the planning done by regional agencies using
HUD financial assistance. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22,302 (1975). The agreement provides, generally, that funds available under the HUD planning assistance program
shall be used to provide the basic land use planning element for both planning
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theless, there is as yet no federal statutory authority for the integration
of the planning efforts required by highway, environmental, coastal
zone management, and other federal programs.
The growing congressional emphasis on mandatory planning at
the state and regional levels presents the states with serious problems
of compliance. Special attention must be paid to the coordination of
federally mandated planning in regions within states, for many regional areas are subject to more than one federal planning requirement. A particular area, for example, may be subject to both coastal
zone planning and to air quality maintenance planning under the
Clean Air Act. Although state and regional planning will occur
simply because federal law mandates it, a coordinated network of
mandatory state and regional plans would help harmonize potentially
overlapping federal planning requirements whose planning should
be coordinated with operative state- and federally-mandated regional
programs to produce a coherent state plan. A mandatory network
of state and regional plans would help to provide this kind of statewide coordination.
While federal planning legislation is directed primarily to state
and regional programs, problems may also arise from the need to
coordinate local planning with federally mandated state and regional
plans. For example, the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
authorizes extensive local participation in the management and planning process. 82 State legislation making local planning mandatory,
rather than optional, would secure the local benefits from such planning programs, and would in turn facilitate local coordination with
the various regional, state, and national planning efforts.
Ill.

THE

NATURE OF PLANNING PRACTICE AND ITS IMPORTANCE
TO LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE
OF PLANNING

As courts and legislatures give enhanced recognition to the role of
the comprehensive plan in land use control, they must also be sensitive to changes that have occurred in planning practice. Comprehensive plans historically have included land use maps that projected a
precise "end-state" to which the community was supposed to conform
programs. Id. at 22,303. See also 24 C.F.R. § 600.72(b) (1975) (authorizing
governmental agencies receiving HUD comprehensive planning assistance to develop
the land use element of their plans "in a form which will aHow them to meet the
requirements of other Federal programs requiring comparable land use elements

...").

82. 16 U.S.C.

§§

1452, 1454(g), 14SS(c) (1)-(2), 1455(f).
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at the close of the planning period. The mapped, end-state plan has
been subject to growing criticism as an overly rigid and not very
useful technique for the statement of community planning goals. 83 It
has been replaced in many communities by a more flexible policy
plan that deemphasizes mapping in favor of textual statements delineating the community's general planning policies. As it has dropped
its function of projecting optimal land development strategies, planning has also established a more intimate relationship with the political process. In some areas it has limited itself to informing policymakers, such as local governing bodies, of the planning consequences of alternative strategies in order to facilitate intelligent
choice. 84
The degree of specificity provided by the plan to guide land use
control administration has thus often declined at the same time that a
substantial expansion in the range of policies covered by the plan has
complicated decision-making. To some extent, the precision with
which the plan can describe future planning alternatives, whether
textually stated or mapped, will depend on the nature and size of the
jurisdiction that prepares the plan. In very small local jurisdictions
the alternatives may be limited, and any plan inevitably will need to
make fairly precise choices regardless of the form it takes. As the
size of the jurisdiction increases, the available alternatives may often
multiply at the same time that the ability to predict the consequences
of any choice diminishes. Size brings an increase both in ~e number
of options and the chance that future unforeseen developments will
alter original projections. For this reason, plans produced at regional
and state levels are less able to delineate definitive development
alternatives. Nevertheless, a regional and state planning perspective
is required to facilitate coordination of local policies and to avoid
undue parochialism (i.e., from exclusionary policies) at the local
level.
Specificity can be achieved in policy planning by more flexible
use of the mapping process, especially when policy plans cover large
83. See Meyerson, Building the Middle-Range Bridge for
Pla1111i11g, 22 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 58 (1956).

Comprehensive

84. An example of this coordinative type of policy planning is the General Plan
Revision Program of the City and County of Honolulu. CITY AND CoUN'IY OF
HONOLULU, PLANNING FOR

OAHU: AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE REsIDENTIAL

POLICIES (1974). The plan discusses four alternative growth strategies for the island
of Oahu, on which the City-County is located. While it favors one of these as the
preferred strategy, it is devoted primarily to an analysis of the governmental programs
that would be needed to make each alternative effective. The plan also explores the
impact that each strategy will have on such variables as housing, the protection of
agricultural and environmental resources, and transportation systems.
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areas. Maps can accurately depict the general policies for an entire
jurisdiction in graphic form. More specific mapped plans can then
be prepared to indicate planning policies for smaller areas, such as
intensive commercial areas or designated residential sub-areas in an
urbanizing county. 85 Detailed plans can be adopted sequentially
whenever they are needed to provide particularized planning for these
areas. Courts would then be able to rely on the detailed area plans as
a more definitive statement of the policies contained in the generalized policy plan, and could consider them in assessing land use
controls adopted to implement the planning process.
These changes in the nature of the planning process should affect
legislative decisions about the kind of plan and planning process to
require, as well as about the role of the plan in the judicial review of
specific land use control actions. While legislation can quite properly
limit itself to formulating planning options and thereby leave specific
choic~ of plan form and purpose to the planning agency, courts will
have to be sensitive to the changing function of plans as they depart
from their traditional mapped form. Policy plans are not entirely
without weight in the land use control process, but the weight that is
given to these plans will depend on their specificity. 86
IV.

JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
POLICIES IN LAND USE LITIGATION

In a number of cases, courts have departed from the restrictive
approach to the "in accordance" requirement that characterized the
85. A mapping system of this type has been adopted in Montgomery County,
See MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLANNING BOARD, PLANNING, ZONING, AND
SUBDMSION IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND 4-11 (1973) [hereinafter M0NTC-OMERY COUNTY MAPPING PLAN]. This mapping system is explained as follows:
The General Plan indicates in broad terms those areas suitable for residential purposes, business or industry, agriculture, open space, transportation,
recreation and community facilities. More detailed and specific land use
recommendations are contained in local Area Master Plans, which deal with
smaller portions of the County. Even more detailed guidelines may be put
forth in Sector Plans, which cover particular localities such as Central Business
Districts or areas in the immediate vicinity of a rapid transit station. An
adopted Area Master Plan or Sector Plan is incorporated as an amendment to
the General Plan.
Id. at 5.
86. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Commrs., 264 Ore. 574, 586 n.3, 507
P.2d 23, 29 n.3 (1973). See also Baker v. City of Milwaukie,_ Ore.-,_, 533
P.2d 772, 777 n.10 (1975) (plan adopting "general parameters of long term growth"
to be given legal effect). For discussion of a policy plan adopted in King County
(Seattle), Washington, see D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, at 107-73. Most courts
that have considered the role of the policy plan in land use regulations have dealt
with plans that make at least generalized indications of future land use patterns. In
some instances, the plan has been. sufficiently specific for the court to consider it a
critical factor in support of rezoning. See, e.g., Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery
County Council, 265 Md. 303, 289 A.2d 303 (1972); Montgomery v. Board of
County Commrs., 263 Md. 1, 280 A.2d 901 (1971).

Maryland.
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early decisions and have given weight to the comprehensive plan in
land use litigation. These decisions have arisen primarily in zoning
litigation in which the courts have been asked to evaluate the consistency of zoning map amendments with the comprehensive plan. While
these cases have so far received the closest judicial scrutiny, the
comprehensive plan functions in other meaningful ways in the zoning
context. For example, land use allocations made through discretionary zoning techniques such as floating zones should also be consistent
with the policies of the comprehensive plan. Growth management
programs should be ordered by the comprehensive plan so that
development opportunities are allocated fairly throughout the growth
management period.
A number of land use control techniques not dependent on the
zoning process may also raise plan consistency questions. Subdivision control ordinances require the direct review and approval of new
subdivisions under standards and criteria provided by the ordinance. 87 Permit requirements in environmental protection legislation
may also be related to a plan. The development permits required by
the Washington State Shoreline Mana.gement Act, 88 for example, are
explicitly related to master programs that are prepared for local
shoreline areas and that contain the principal elements of a plan.
While decisions considering the consistency of permits and other
direct approvals with their controlling planning policies are not yet
numerous,89 it can be expected that these questions will soon be frequently litigated.90
While courts have so far given weight to comprehensive planning
policies primarily in evaluating map amendments to local zoning
ordinances, municipalities have_.also relied on the comprehensive plan
in defending against landowner attacks on zoning regulations in cases
in which the municipality has refused to rezone. A comprehensive
plan reflects a collective judgment about the allocation of development opportunities throughout the community made prior to a zoning
map change that alters the restrictions applicable to a particular par87. See 1969 REPORT, supra note 42, at 203.
88. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.010 to 930 (Supp. 1974). For a discussion of the
Management Act, see Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971,
49 WASH. L. REv. 423 (1974).
89. For a case considering statutory environmental impact requirements when
land development with a potential for substantial environmental impact is contemplated, see In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
90. See ALI, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, 2-211 (1975) (authorizing at
the option of local governments the adoption of land use permits in "specially
planned areas" directly to implement local plans).
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eel of land.91 The underlying issue in both sorts of cases is the presumptive weight to be given to this prior collective judgment. The
courts have resolved this issue in different ways. This article argues
that for effective implementation of a mandatory planning requirement, the courts must give presumptive weight to the policies of the
comprehensive plan as they are applied in land use control administration, unless special circumstances indicate that the plan is no
longer entitled to such authority. The decjsions suggest what these
special circumstances might be. First, cases involving the policies
of a comprehensive plan will be examined in the context of landowner attacks on restrictive zoning ordinances. Attention will then
be turned to the role of the plan in the zoning amendment procedures established by the zoning ordinance.

A.

Planning as a Defense to Attacks on Land Use Control Systems

Suit has often been brought on the ground that land use controls
implementing a comprehensive plan are unconstitutionally restrictive.
In defense, the municipality has argued that the policies of the
comprehensive plan justify the challenged land use restrictions. These
cases have thus presented the courts with an opportunity to dea]
broadly with the comprehensive plan as a substantive prior justification for the community's land use control effort.
One group of decisions in this category has considered the role of
the comprehensive plan as a justification for large lot zoning restrictions. This zoning has, in recent years, been under increasing attack
as an exclusionary device intended to restrict new development in
urbanizing areas. 92 Nevertheless, large lot zoning can be a useful
means to implement planning policies aimed at controlling community growth. When a local growth plan is based on a regional growth
control policy, the exclusionary argument is less persuasive, and
courts may be inclined to uphold both the local planning policies and
the large lot zoning that implements them.
An important decision that considers a large lot zoning strategy in
the context of a regional growth control plan is Norbeck Village Joint
Venture v. Montgomery County Council. 93 In the mid-1960s, the
91. See Tarlock, supra note 21, at 83-84.
92. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Township of Willistown
v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.,_ Pa.-, 341 A.2d 466 (1975) (relying on Mt. Laurel);
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land
& Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
93. 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969); see also N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at§
26.11. Norbeck was relied upon in Montgomery County Council v. Leizman, 268
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regional planning agency for the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area adopted a plan calling for growth in radial corridors that were to
be separated by green wedges of open space.94 This plan, which received presidential approval, was to be complemented by subregional
growth plans implementing the wedges and corridors concept. A
number of subregional plans of this type were devised, including an
integrated general plan adopted by two suburban Maryland counties,
Montgomery and Prince Georges. It was one of a set of area plans
enacted within Montgomery County to implement the general plan
that came before the court in Norbeck. 95
The town of Olney was identified by the challenged area plan, in
accordance with the wedges and corridors concept, as a "satellite
community." In order to break the pattern of suburban sprawl, it
would be maintained as an autonomous community surrounded by a
low-density residential area. Zoning and sewer access restrictions
were to be employed to accomplish staged development. 96 As part of
a comprehensive rezoning of fifty square miles by the county council,
some twenty square miles around Olney were downzoned from onehalf-acre to two-acre lots. Plaintiffs, whose land was included in the
area reclassified to the lower density, challenged the rezoning as
unreasonable and arbitrary and as an improper substitute of the
police power for the power of eminent domain. Holding for the
county, the court relied heavily on the policies of the plan to sustain
the comprehensive rezoning: "Appellants dispute the validity of the
concept underlying the plan and the legality of the plan but do not
suggest that it was not conceived and adopted in the utmost good
faith, and they did not overcome the strong presumption that the plan
was valid legislative action . . . ."97
Md. 621, 303 A.2d 374 (1973), in which the court upheld a comprehensive rezoning
designed to create a buffer zone based on a master plan for the area. The court
found that the rezoning was, in the words of the local planning commission, based on
a "desire to build and preserve in concert with the natural environment," and
therefore was valid. 268 Md. at 632, 303 A.2d at 379. See also County Council for
Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975). Cf.
Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 313 A.2d 741 (Me. 1974).
94. NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGIONAL
PLANNING COUNCIL, A POLICIES PLAN FOR TIIB YEAR 2000: THE NATION'S CAPITAL
(1961).
95. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY MAPPING PLAN, supra note 85, at 4-5. For a map
of the planning areas, see id. at 6.
96. 254 Md. at 63-64, 254 A.2d at 703-04.
97. 254 Md. at 67, 254 A.2d at 705-06. In rejecting the taking argument, the
court noted that all zoning places restrictions on the owner's right to use his property.
It concluded that although some restrictions may lessen the value of the property, an
owner does not have a vested right in the continuation of the prior zoning status of
his property.
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The court in Norbeck did not question the policies of the plan
and so did not undertake an independent examination of its impact
on development in the county and the region. In particular, no effort
was made to examine the population target on which the plan was
based, the plan's assumptions about the role of Olney in the implementation of the wedges and corridors concept, the plan's policies for
staging growth, or its assumption that the county was entitled to
withhold and phase the availability of public services in order to
implement the staged growth policy contemplated by the plan. The
court apparently accorded the plan a presumption of validity because
it was based on the concepts adopted in the regional plan for the
Washington metropolitan area and had been legislatively enacted.
These issues had surfaced in an earlier and somewhat similar
Michigan case, Christine Building Co. v. City of Troy. 98 Christine
considered the validity of large lot zoning in the context of a comprehensive community plan adopted by a new and fast-growing Detroit
suburb. This plan contemplated a sevenfold increase in the population of the city and a tenfold increase in the city's sewer district area.
Population growth was to be limited by the area's sewer capacity as
projected in a multicommunity contract that provided for sewage
disposal by the City of Detroit. In order to achieve its target population, the city zoned plaintiff's lots at a density of one-half acre.
Plaintiff then brought suit attacking the large lot zoning for his property.
The majority in Christine found for the plaintiff, noting that other
lots near plaintiff's property were zoned at smaller sizes and were
allowed septic tanks, 99 and that the sewage disposal contract could be
altered to allow for a larger capacity. 100 The court also had doubts
about the validity of a zoning and planning program that was oriented toward development in the future rather than toward conditions as they presently existed. 101 A strong dissent, however, was
concerned that the favorable holding for the plaintiff might provide
a "point of attack" leading to the gradual erosion of the community
plan. 102 Unlike the majority, the dissent was willing to defer to the
policies reflected in the plan. It noted that allocating additional sewage capacity to plaintiff's property would deprive other areas in Troy
98. 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962).
99. 367 Mich. at 515, 116 N.W.2d at 819.
100. 367 Mich. at 518, 116 N.W.2d at 821.
101. 367 Mich. at 516, 116 N.W.2d at 819.
102. 367 Mich. at 524, 116 N.W.2d at 824 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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of needed service. 103 It might also have pointed out that it would
be difficult to effect change in the regional agreement, for this would
reduce the capacity available to the other communities served by this
agreement. 104
While Christine takes an unfavorable position on the role of the
plan in guiding zoning designations, the decision was influenced by
the fact that the plan had been adopted by only one municipality in a
growing region. To this extent, it can be distinguished from
Norbeck. In any event, the Michigan supreme court has since had
second thoughts on this particular question. Large lot zoning for
approximately one-half-acre lots was upheld by the court in Padover
v. Township of Farmington, 105 in which supporters of such zoning
again sought justification in a community plan's population target. In
Padover, the target was based not on expected sewage capacity, but
on the planners' estimate of optimal neighborhood size for elementary schools. While the court was badly split, and while the favorable
opinions rely to some extent on the failure of the plaintiff to rebut the
presumption that zoning is constitutional,106 a comment in one of the
concurring opinions provides an important judicial rationale for acceptance of the comprehensive plan as a justification for zoning
policies:
If this Court is to remain dogmatic in its insistence upon proofs of
validity having an absolute relevance to existing conditions then all
planning and zoning based upon projections for future needs could
logically be thwarted. Zoning in a new community where land uses
have not already been determined is always prospective in nature.
There is the need to plan for expectant population densities so that
community needs may be based thereupon . . . . The presumption is that if the plan is sound then the structure will also be sound.
It takes time however, for things to take shape. Community planners
like homebuilders require this initial indulgence. If plans and projections fail to develop then [their] validity may be challenged.107
Subsequent decisions by the Michigan supreme court, however,
again cast doubt on the scope of its acceptance of planning policies as
103. 367 Mich. at 524, 116 N.W.2d at 823-24 (Adams, J., dissenting).
104. The Troy plan and ordinance were later invalidated in Roll v. City of Troy,
370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963).
105. 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965).
106. 374 Mich. at 640, 132 N.W.2d at 696 (Smith, J., concurring) ("presumption
in favor of the constitutionality'' of the ordinance); 374 Mich. at 633, 132 N.W.2d
at 692 (plaintiff has "burden of affirmatively proving" that the ordinance is unconstitutional).
107. 374 Mich. at 642-43, 132 N.W.2d at 697 (Smith, J., concurring).
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a basis for zoning restrictions. 108 Moreover, Padover touches, but
leaves unresolved, the question of whether zoning ordinances may
constitutionally defer development for substantial periods if they are
based on plans that contain explicit or implicit population limits for
urbanizing areas. 109
Absent a showing that a local plan is based on an exclusionary
purpose, a court would be wise to defer to the policies of the plan as a
justification for the restrictions contained in the ordinance. Otherwise, the "point of attack" described by the dissent in Christine will
provide an opportunity for the gradual erosion of planning policy.
The difficulty is that the courts may be unwilling to examine the
policies of a local plan to determine whether they are acceptable from
a state or regional perspective, since this examination might involve
the courts in matters beyond proper judicial competence and jurisdiction.110 This perceived limitation on judicial review may explain
108. See, e.g., Biske v. City of Troy, 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967),
revd. in part, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969).
In Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971),
the Michigan court of appeals adopted the doctrine that the burden of proof to justify
a prohibition of a land use shifts to the municipality whenever the use falls into a
"preferred use" category. Rights of preferred use are delineated in the state constitution, statutes, or judicial precedents, and include churches, schools and hospitals. 35
Mich. App. at 212-13, 192 N.W.2d at 325-26. Mobile homes were involved in
Bristow, and the doctrine was extended to include apartments in Simmons v. Royal
Oak, 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972). However, in Kropf v. City of
Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974), it was made cJear that the
doctrine is not based solely on preferred use status, but that the preferred use must
also be totally excluded from a municipality before the burden of proof may be
shifted to the municipality. Bristow also discussed possible justifications for the
exclusion of a preferred use, including reliance on an existing and flexible master
plan. 35 Mich. at 219-20, 192 N.W.2d at 329. A local master plan was relied upon
as partial justification for the exclusion of a preferred use in Cohen v. Canton Twp.,
38 Mich. App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972). Kropf adds nothing to the role of the
master plan in justifying the exclusion of preferred uses or in establishing the
reasonableness of classification prohibiting a preferred use within a part of a
municipality. For a discussion of the Bristow line of cases and the impact of Kropf,
see Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial
Act: The "New Look'' in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344-60 (1975);
Comment, The Michigan Preferred Use Doctrine as a Strategy for Regional LowIncome Housing Development: A Progress Report, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 207 (1974).
109. This question was resolved to some extent in Golden v. Planning Bd. of the
Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), discussed in text at notes 112-20 infra. See also
Camboni's, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 26 Ill.2d 427, 187 N.E.2d 212 (1963)
(rezoning ordinance sustained as reasonable in light of anticipated growth in the
area). But cf. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N'.E.2d 587
(1938) (downzoning from an unrestricted to a residential classification held unconstitutional primarily because of the uncertainty of future development).
110. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359,
376, 285 N.E.2d 291, 301, 334 N,Y.S.2d 138, 150-51, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972): "The evolution of more sophisticated efforts to contend with the increasing
complexities of urban and suburban growth has been met by a corresponding

April 1976]

Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan

927

why the opinions are characterized by a willingness either to accept
or reject the plan, with little examination of the policy on which it
was formulated. The decisions underline the need for some politically acceptable method of administrative plan review that would include the authority to modify as well as merely to accept or reject
local planning policies. Alternatively, explicit legislative authority
may be needed that will be least allow a court to retain jurisdiction
over a case until the plan can be amended to satisfy the court's objections.111
Other cases in which the plan has been asserted as a defense have
considered local timing and managed growth programs. Perhaps the
best-known of these is Golden v. Planning Board of the Township of
Ramapo, 112 in which an urbanizing township on the outskirts of the
New York City metropolitan area amended its zoning ordinance to
implement a permit system of all new residential development. Permits would be granted only if the development were adequately
served by public facilities, with adequacy to be determined by a point
system based on the proximity of the development to available services. The court found that the township had authority to enact the
ordinance under the applicable New York zoning legislation, which
generally followed the outlines of the Standard ~tate Zoning Enareluctance on the part of the judiciary to substitute its judgment as to the plan's overall effectiveness for the considered deliberations of its progenitors." But see Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(1975). See also Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194(3)(a) (Supp. 1975) (authorizing a court, in reviewing
local government action or development regulations, to consider the "reasonableness"
of the comprehensive plan).
111. Some state legislation has sought to deal with this problem. See, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10609.1, 11004, 11011 (1972). Under section 11011, a court
invalidating a zoning ordinance may approve a development or use for which plans
have been submitted to the local zoning agency, or may approve the development in
part and refer any unapproved elements to the local agency for further proceedings.
The court may retain jurisdiction of the appeal during such further proceedings and
may issue such supplementary orders as are necessary to protect the landowner's
rights. This section was construed in Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, _
Pa.
Commnw. - , 333 A.2d 239 (1975). For discussion of the Pennsylvania zoning
procedures see Krasnowiecki, supra note 32. For a similar proposal authorizing a
judicial stay order until the municipality has amended its land use regulations in
accordance with the order of the court, see A.L.I. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 9112(2) (1975).
112. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972). Much of the extensive commentary on Ramapo is critical of the
decision, emphasizing the actual or potential exclusionary impact of the growth
control program. See H. FRANKLIN, CONTROLLING URBAN GROWI11-BUT FOR
WHOM? (1973); Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 234 (1973); Scott, Comments on
Golden, 24 ZONING DIGE5r 75 (1972). But see Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation
of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974).
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bling Act. 113 The court then proceeded to uphold the timing control
in a complex opinion that relied in part on the fact that the challenged
ordinance had implemented a well-considered plan for the community. This plan included a capital improvements program on which
the public facility point system was based.114
Due process "taking" issues were also raised in Ramapo by the
fact that development was to be deferred in some sections of the
community by as much as eighteen years, but the court accepted the
restriction as a necessary component of the timing ordinance.11° The
court's handling of this issue must be understood in the context of the
plan's objectives. Since the timing plan apparently contemplated the
development of the entire township by the end of the eighteen-year
period, though at very low densities, it operated more as an interim
control on development than as a permanent restriction. It was the
township's commitment to allow the private development of all of its
land area within the prescribed period that appears to have neutralized the due process "taking" allegations for the court. More explicit
interim zoning ordinances aimed at halting land development pending
the adoption of a plan or zoning ordinance have been judicially
affirmed elsewhere. 116 The holding in Ramapo thus should be confined to the planning context in which it arose, and it provides
doubtful support for comparable timing controls that are implemented in significantly different circumstances.
More troublesome in Ramapo is the potential for exclusion, since
the township was zoned at relatively low densities through large lot
zoning. As the court noted, these densities were not challenged,
although the court on first impression could find no justification for
them. 117 The application of timing controls in the context of the
large lot zoning pattern simply reinforced the low density restriction,
since even development meeting the requirement of the point system
could occur only at these densities. 118 The court did consider the
exclusionary argument in Ramapo, but concluded that, in the absence
113. See note 9, supra and accompanying text.
114. 30 N.Y.2d at 378,285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (''The restrictions
conform to the community's considered land use policies as expressed in its comprehensive plan and represent a bona fide effort to maximize population density
consistent with orderly growth").
115. 30 N.Y.2d at 380-82, 285 N.E.2d at 303-04, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154-56.
116. See, e.g., Collura v. Town of Arlington, _ Mass. - , 329 N.E.2d 733
(1975); New York City Housing Authority v. Commissioner of the Environmental
Conserv. Dept., 83 Misc. 2d 89, 372 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1975); State v.
Snohomish County, 79 Wash. 2d 619, 488 P.2d 511 (1971). For further discussion
of interim zoning ordinances, see 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at § 30.03,
117. 30 N.Y.2d at 367 n.2, 285 N.E.2d at 295 n.2, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143 n.2.
118. See H. FRANKLIN, supra note 112, at 13-15,
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of supervisory state and regional land use controls then lacking in
New York State, locally adopted timing programs deserved judicial
sanction. 119 In •part, the court's decision on this point can be explained by the failure of the plaintiffs to provide adequate factual
support for the exclusionary argument. 120 Ramapo may also be
explained by the fact that no downzoning was alleged to have occurred as a result of the timing control ordinance, so that the legality
of a downzoning in conjunction with a timing program was not at
issue.
Nor did the Ramapo case consider the validity of the timing plan
as applied to a specific development that had been disapproved and
thus deferred under the point system. A similar issue arose in
Michigan in Biske v. City of Troy. 121 The city had prepared a
comprehensive plan that included the area in question within a
projected civic center and commercial complex. This area was almost totally undeveloped except for some municipal buildings, and
there was no explicit phased program for the development in accordance with the plan's objectives. Plaintiff owned a vacant lot at the
intersection of two secondary highways in the area, and proposed to
develop a gasoline filling station there. Although filling stations
occupied two of the other comers of the intersection, his request for
a zoning change was refused because it was inconsistent with the
plan.
The Michigan intermediate appellate court upheld the city's refusal to rezone in an opinion that followed the Padover approach of
validating the zoning restriction by relying on the community's planning policies. 122 The state supreme court reversed on the ground
that the city's plan had not yet been legislatively adopted. But the
court added an ambiguous comment that appears to limit the Padover
holding. By relying "too much" on the plan, said the court, the city
had adopted a "speculative" standard that failed to consider suffi119. 30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150. But see
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 112, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975) (in the absence of regional zoning, a court must assess the
reasonableness of local zoning in light of regional needs).
120. Comprehensive planning programs, including large lot restrictions, have
fallen into judicial disfavor in other jurisdictions in cases in which the exclusionary
argument bas been pressed. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 188 n.20, 336 A.2d 713, 732 n.20 (1975)
(indicating that timing plans like the Ramapo plan "cannot be utilized as an
exclusionary device or to stop all further development and must include early
provision for low and moderate income housing").
'
121. 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967), revd. in part, 381 Mich. 611,
166 N.W.2d 453 (1969). See D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, at 53-54.
122. 6 Mich. App. at 551-52, 149 N.W.2d at 902.
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ciently the effect of the plan on the landowner's use of his property.
The property owner must keep his land vacant, though subject to
local taxes, while hoping that the development proposed by the plan
would materialize.123
'
Biske was in essence a timing case. The community did not
object to commercial development on the property; its only objection
was that the development proposed by the plaintiff was not sufficiently intensive and did not implement the policies contained in the
comprehensive plan. What makes the Biske plan speculative, as
compared with the timing plan upheld in Ramapo, is that the Ramapo plan provided for carefully phased development throughout the
municipality, while in Biske there is no such guarantee. Most municipalities will be unable to give the assurances that Ramapo was able to
provide, and in these municipalities the "speculative" objection of the
Michigan supreme court in Biske will be difficult to overcome. Perhaps the comment quoted above from the Padover concurrence is
relevant. Initial acceptance by the court of the plan's proposals
appears warranted in order to provide reinforcement for the plan's
policies. 124 Appropriate judicial relief could be made available after
a time if the plan still appeared "speculative," either because the
development proposed by the plan did not materialize or because
actual development patterns did not follow the plan. 126 From this
perspective, initial enforcement of the plan is indistinguishable from
support of zoning to implement the plan on an interim basis, and
interim zoning of this kind has respectable precedent. 126 Moreover,
judicial relief is appropriate if the plan's policies are not followed in
the zoning process. 127 If the courts are willing to take a flexible
123. 381 Mich. at 617, 166 N.W.2d at 456-57.
124. See text at note 107 supra.
125. See Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d
155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973). Cf. Bissell v. County Cornmrs., 12 Ore. App. 174,
506 P.2d 499 (1973), in which the court upheld the county's denial of commercial
zoning at an arterial intersection that the plan had designated for commercial uses.
There was evidence that the intersection had not developed for commercial uses as
the plan had contemplated. For an analysis of the consistency of apartment
rezonings with an adopted policy plan, see D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, at 127-62.
126. Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing
Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URBAN L. 65 (1971). The court in Ramapo
pointed out that, although the developer could depend on nothing more than the
town's good faith in adhering to its scheduled program of capital improvements,
"there will be ample opportunity to undo the restrictions upon default." 30 N.Y.2d at
382, 285 N.E,2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
127. Cf. Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975), in which a suburban county adjacent to Washington,
D.C., had adopted but had not consistently followed a development policy favoring
the location of new growth in a suburban "new town." The court relied on this in-
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approach toward plans that contemplate zoning restrictions to achieve
timing objectives, the objections raised to the implementation of the
comprehensive, plan in Biske can be resolved through prudent judicial
supervision.
Planning policies may also be implemented through land use
control techniques other than large lot zoning and timing controls. An
example, closely related to the Biske situation, is the creation of
exclusive industrial and commercial zones in which residential uses
are prohibited. Persons seeking to develop for residential purposes in
exclusively nonresidential zones, as well as those seeking to locate
nonresidential development outside these zones, are in a position to
raise due process "taking" objections. In cases that fail to consider
comprehensive planning policies, courts have accepted exclusively
nonresidential zoning provided it represents an expected market demand.128 Courts can limit the use of such zoning when the supply of
exclusively zoned nonresidential land is not reasonably related to the
expected need for that land. 129
B.

The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in the
Zoning Amendment Process

A number of cases in which the comprehensive plan may play a
role do not involve the constitutionality of community-wide or major
zoning strategies. They focus instead on the permissibility of zoning
changes that allow an individual owner to make a more intensive use
of his land. 130 If the rezoning is not consistent with land uses iu the
surrounding area, it may appear to be a special favor, often termed
"spot zoning." For years courts have dealt with spot zoning amendconsistency in holding unconstitutional the low density residential zoning that was
applicable to the property in this case. This property was not within the area that
had been planned for the growth of the new town. .See also Board of Supervisors
v. Williams,_ Va-, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
128. See Grubel v. MacLaughlin, 286 F. Supp. 24 (D.V.I. 1968). Cf. Bosse v.
City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523, 226 A.2d 99 (1967). See Note, Industrial Zoning
To Exclude Higher Uses, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1261 (1957). But cf. City of Tempe v.
Rasor, 24 Ariz. App. 118, 536 P.2d 239 (1975). See also Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
129. As in the managed growth timing cases, a question will arise concerning the
constitutionally acceptable time period that land may be held off the market for
exclusive, nonresidential uses. In Ramapo the court held that an 18-year period was
not too long. 30 N.Y.2d at 367, 383, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 304-05, 334 N.Y.S. at 143,
156.
130. These cases also include some in which the developers proposed a use on
their land not presently permitted by the zoning ordinance. When the use change
was refused, these developers brought suit to have the zoning ordinance set aside as
unconstitutional, and the courts relied to some extent on the policies of the plan when
passing on the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance as applied.
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ments and have devised a number of rules to determine whether they
should be upheld. Perhaps the most familiar of these is the changemistake rule adopted by the Maryland courts131 and followed in a few
other states.132 This rule validates a spot zoning only if a mistake in
the initial zoning ordinance or a change in conditions in the neighborhood surrounding the rezoned area can be shown. 133 The changemistake rule considers the comprehensive plan only advisory in determining whether there has been a change or mistake. Other courts do
not follow the change-mistake rule, but nevertheless do not explicitly
rely on a comprehensive plan. These courts are willing to validate a
spot zoning if it serves the general needs or policies of the community
and if the landowner who receives the zone is not the sole beneficiary.1a4
In recent years, some courts have placed greater emphasis on the
comprehensive plan in determining whether to validate a zoning
change to a more intensive use. Most of these decisions have come
from state courts that have not adopted the change-mistake rule and
are therefore in a position to review a rezoning on the basis of a
change (not only, a "mistake") in community policy as well as a
change in the area surrounding the rezoned parcel.13 G To varying
degrees, these decisions have reversed th_e presumption of legislative
validity that is usually accorded rezoning actions. 136 By presuming
the change to be invalid, the court is in a position to demand
justification from the municipality for such rezoning. The policies
underlying the comprehensive plan are one obvious source of support.137 By requiring evidence from the municipality in support of
the rezoning to more intensive uses, the court is able to evaluate the
basis for the change without actually investigating the policies of the
comprehensive plan.
131. Professor Williams traces the origins of this rule back to early cases such as
Baltimore City, Northwest Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60
A.2d 743 (1948). See N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at § 6.06 & n.26. See also
Comment, Zoning Amendments: The Effect of Maryland's Change or Mistake Rule
on the Fairly Debatable Standard-Who's Got The Presumptions?, 10 URBAN L.
ANN. 365 (1975).
132. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 S.2d 384 (Miss. 1966). Cf. Hodge
v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1962).
133. The Maryland cases are discussed in D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, at 90-96
and 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at§ 6.06.
134. 1 R. .ANDERSON, .AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 5.06 (1968).
135. See text at notes 138-44 infra.
136. See text at notes 138-44 infra.
137. Ramapo specifically noted the increasing sophistication of land use controls
as a reason for giving deference to the timing control ordinance. 30 N.Y.2d at 37677, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
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This approach was followed recently by an Illinois court of appeals in a case concerning the validity of a rezoning that would have
permitted apartment development in a suburban area of Cook
County. The court did not fully shift the presumption of validity, but
relied on the absence of a comprehensive plan as a basis for its
finding that the "presumption of validity which otherwise would
attach to a county zoning ordinance" had been weakened. 138 It was
established not only that the county did not have a comprehensive
plan, but also that the county commissioners who approved the
rezoning had not even consulted any of the county's own agencies
charged with the planning function. Aware of the problems that the
new development would create,139 the court found that the board of
commissioners' action was an "arbitrary and capricious use of its
power," and therefore invalid.140
Other decisions have modified the traditional presumption of
validity by treating the zoning amendment procedure as a quasijudicial rather than a legislative process. Foremost among these is
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners. 141 This Oregon supreme
138. Forestview Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230,
244-46, 309 N.E.2d 763, 774-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
139. The rezoning would have introduced from 4000 to 6000 new residents in
what had previously been a single family residential community. Local facilities,
including schools, were inadequate to support this new population, and the proposed
apartments might have depreciated the value of adjacent single-family residences and
created flooding problems.
140. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 309 N.E.2d at 776. The court noted that this was not
a case in which the zoning classification achieved a "relative gain to the public and
hardship to a property owner." 18 Ill. App. 3d at 246-47, 309 N.E.2d at 775.
Further, the rule that a zoning classification will not be changed except for the public
good supported the position of the property owners. However, courts have occasionally stressed the somewhat contrary theory that property owners have no vested right
in the continuation of existing zones. See note 97 supra. There are decisions in
other states which support the Illinois view. See, e.g., Raabe v. City of Walker, 383
Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970) (creation of an industrial zone in the midst of a
residential area which was hampered by the lack of a general plan for the area and
unsupported by a change in conditions, was not in the public interest). In Grant v.
Washington Township, 1 Ohio App. 2d 84, 203 N.E.2d 859 (1963), the court held
that imposing an 80,000 square foot lot size restriction on an entire tract that was
located in what was essentially a rural location was unreasonable, although it might
be justified for part of the tract There did not appear to be a general plan or
substantial basis for the pattern of the town's development. But cf. Brandau v. City
of Grosse Pointe Park, 383 Mich. 471, 175 N.W.2d 755 (1970) (unsuccessful
challenge to a 30-year-old ordinance restricting property that was surrounded by
predominately commercial zoning to residential or parking use).
141. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). The court built on, but to some extent
qualified, its earlier holding in Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 161, 458
P.2d 405 (1969).
For discussion of the Fasano case, see Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano, An
Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J.
358 (1974) (Mr. Sullivan was counsel for the county in Fasano). See also
Cunningham, supra note 108.
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court decision first rejected the usual rule that zoning amendments
are legislative, and, by adopting the contrary position that the zoning
amendment process is quasi-judicial, was able to shift completely the
presumption of validity that is usually applied to zoning amendments.
Fasano also placed heavy weight on the comprehensive plan as a
justification for zoning amendments, 142 and in so doing established
strong judicial support for the role of the plan in the zoning process.
Fasano considered the adoption by the county of a floating zone
to allow a mobile home park in an area not previously zoned for this
use. Oregon legislation at the time mandated planning by counties
and required that zoning ordinances carry out the comprehensive
plan. Accordingly, the court held that a zoning amendment must be
consistent with the plan, but qualified its assertion with several conditions that make the role of the plan ambiguous. 143 The court apparently required that there be proof that a "public need" for the change
exists and that this need would best be served by making the change
at the proposed location. 144 Since the purpose of the plan, in a broad
sense, is to indicate public "needs" for land use, the function of this
additional showing is not clear.
The court also noted that "[t]he more drastic the change, the
greater will be the burden of showing that it is in conformance with
the comprehensive plan as implemented by the ordinance . . . ."14 G
This burden apparently requires proof that alternative sites originally
designated by the plan are not available, a requirement that enhances
the authority of the plan's land use allocations. 146 But the court held
as well that a mistake in the original plan or ordinance, or changes in
the physical characteristics of an area affected by the zoning change,
would be relevant, though not determinative. It thus adopted a
qualified version of the Maryland change-mistake rule. 147 This holding qualifies the court's reliance on a comprehensive plan as the basis
for a zoning change, since changes in a surrounding area that might
142. 264 Ore. at 583, 507 P.2d at 27-28.
143. 264 Ore. at 583-84, 507 P.2d at 28.
144. 264 Ore. at 584, 507 P.2d at 28. See South Central Assn. of Neighbors, Inc.
v. Lindsey,_ Ore. App.-, 535 P.2d 1381 (1975), in which the need test was applied to hold invalid a rezoning from residential to commercial.
145. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.
146. An important case applying the alternative site test is Duddles v. City
Council,_ Ore. App.-, 535 P.2d 583 (1975). While admitting that a tract shown
as commercial on the city's plan was less suitable for commercial use than a nearby
tract, the court nevertheless applied the policy of the plan to invalidate the rezoning
of the nearby tract The court noted that unless the plan was amended to allow
commercial use on the disputed tract, the commercial designation for the nearby tract
should be eliminated.
147. 264 Ore. at 587, 507 P.2d at 29.
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support a zoning amendment will not have taken place where the plan
proposes more intensive uses in areas whose character is not fully
determined. Finally, although the court spoke throughout as if it
were dealing with a plan containing fairly precise mapped designations, a footnote to the opinion described a hypothetical plan containing textual policies rather than mapped intentions and implicitly
recognized that, as the precision of the plan declines, the burden of
showing conformance is more easily met. 148
On balance, Fasano is important for its insistence that the burden
of justifying the zoning amendment should increase as the impact of a
proposed zoning amendment on the surrounding area increases. This
approach is reminiscent of those nuisance cases that enjoin the location of more intensive land uses in areas where they are not compatible with surrounding uses; it weakens the supportive impact of the
plan whenever the plan has proposed intensive uses for low intensity
or undeveloped areas. It can be argued that reliance on the comprehensive plan as a justification for a zoning change appears most
necessary in precisely these situations. When the approved zoning
amendment is consistent with at least some of the surrounding development, the approved use ordinarily _is not intrusive, and courts might
well validate the change on the basis of standard concepts such as the
Maryland change-mistake rule. It is only when the plan proposes a
relatively intensive use in a less developed area that the changemistake rule cannot be applied and the reliance on the plan to support
the rezoning becomes essential. While the Fasano case was an
important explanation of the role of the plan in validating zoning
changes, the doctrinal basis for judicial recognition of the plan required additional refinement and elaboration.
This elaboration was forthcoming from the Oregon supreme
court in Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 149 which considered the validity
of a zoning ordinance allowing a residential density more intensive
than that permitted by a subsequently adopted comprehensive plan.
By the time the Baker case came before the court, the legislature had
mandated the adoption of comprehensive plans by cities as well as by
counties. 160 However, no language in the statute explicitly treated
148. 264 Ore. at 586-87 n.3, 507 P.2d at 29 n.3.
149. _Ore.-, 533 P.2d 772 (1975).
150. ORE. REv. STAT. § 197.175(2) (Replacement Part 1973). The city planning
legislation in Oregon had initially been permissive and a plan was authorized but not
required. ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.090(2). Since its inception, county planning
legislation has been mandatory. ORE. REv. STAT. § 215.050. The Fasano doctrine
has been applied to both city and county zoning amendments. See notes 141 and 146
supra.
The Baker court held that the permissive character of the planning statute at the
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the problem of the consistency of zoning with an adopted city plan.
Nevertheless, relying heavily on Eves, 161 on a California decision
holding comprehensive plan adoption to be a legislative act, 152 and on
legal commentary,153 the Oregon court unequivocally accorded the
plan a binding status in local zoning:
[W]e conclude that a comprehensive plan is the controlling land use
planning instrument for a city. Upon passage of a comprehensive
plan a city assumes a responsibility to effectuate that plan and conform prior conflicting zoning ordinances to it. We further hold that
the zoning decisions of a city must be in accord with that plan and a
zoning ordinance which allows a more intensive use than that prescribed by the plan must fail. 154

The impact of Baker on the Fasano case is not entirely clear. While
Baker speaks only of cities, there is no warrant in Oregon law for not
applying its rationale to counties, which are also required to plan.
Another important question is whether Baker overrules some of the
qualifications, such as the "public need" test, that Fasano placed on
the weight to be given the comprehensive plan in zoning. Since
Baker considered a zoning ordinance directly in conflict with an
adopted comprehensive plan, the court may not have intended that
the rationale of the case apply to the zoning amendment process.
Baker states, however, that the comprehensive plan is binding on
zoning decisions as well as zoning ordinances,165 and these decisions
would presumably include amendments. These questions aside, the
Baker court appears to have adopted as strong a view of the role
of the comprehensive plan as any court that has considered the problem. It stands as a polar opposite to Kozesnik. 156
time of the adoption of the Milwaukie plan and zoning ordinance was irrelevant, since
the city had in fact adopted a plan whether or not required to do so, and thus had a
duty to zone in accordance with it. _Ore._,-, 533 P.2d 772, 776-77.
151. _ Ore. at_, 533 P.2d at 776. See text at notes 28-36 supra.
152. _ Ore. at _, 533 P.2d at 778. This case, O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965), contains strong dictum supporting the binding
role of the plan in land use controls administration.
153. _ Ore. at-, - , _, 533 P.2d at 775, 778, 779. The court cited Haar,
In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, supra note 21; Haar, The Master Plan:
An Impermanent Constitution, supra note 21.
154. _ Ore. at-, 533 P.2d at 779. The Baker decision also relics, but does not
appear to be dependent, on a provision in the Oregon City Zoning Enabling Act that
requires local zoning ordinances to be based on a "well considered plan." ORE. REV.
STAT. § 227.240(1) (Replacement Part 1973). This language is similar to the "in
accordance" language contained in the Standard State Zoning -Enabling Act. See text
at notes 10-13 supra.
For a discussion of internal consistency between plan maps and plan texts, see
Tierney v. Duris,_ Ore. App.-, 536 P.2d 435 (1975) (amending a plan map to
correct an inconsistency does not represent a change in the comprehensive plan).
155. _ Ore. at-, 533 P.2d at 779.
156. See text at notes 22-26 supra.
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Courts in other states have recently considered the weight to be
given the comprehensive plan in determining the validity of zoning
amendments. 157 These courts continue to treat rezoning as a legislative act. The cases can be grouped according to whether the proposed use was consistent with the plan and whether the court looked
to the policies of the plan in passing on the zoning amendment.
Several courts, albeit with little discussion, have given weight to
the comprehensive plan in disapproving zoning amendments found to
be inconsistent with the plan's policies. 158 The Baker case provides
especially strong reinforcement for this position, but it has an important companion in Udell v. Haas, 159 a 1968 decision by the Court of
Appeals of New York. Udell considered a downzoning rather than
an upzoning, and so may be distinguishable from the Oregon cases,
but the principles stated by· the New York court would appear to
apply in both situations.
In Udell, a small village on Long Island had rezoned a parcel of
land, located on its periphery and abutting a major highway, from
commercial to residential uses. The court found the downzoning
invalid, relying in part on the principle that it had not been "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan" as required by the New York
state zoning enabling statute. The New York court has never inter157. For a similar analysis that is not based explicitly on the zoning amendment
process, see 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at § 25.01-26.23. Williams distinguishes
primarily between those cases adhering to the Kozesnik view and those cases in which
there is willingness to give some weight to an independently adopted comprehensive
plan.
.
158. See, e.g., Fontaine v. Board of County Commrs. 493 P.2d 670 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1972); Green v. County Planning & Zoning Commn., _ Del. Ch. - , 340
A.2d 852 (1974), affd., 344 A.2d 386 (1975); Board of County Commrs. v. Farr,
242 Md. 315, 218 A.2d 923 (1966); Schilling v. City of Midland, 38 Mich. App.
568, 196 N.W.2d 846 (1972); Heram Holding Corp. v. City of Albany, 63 Misc.
2d 152, 311 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Cf. Sampson Bros., Inc. v. Board of
County Commrs., 240 Md. 116,213 A.2d 289 (1965).
For Maryland change-mistake cases in which a zoning change inconsistent with a
comprehensive plan was disapproved, see Valenzia v. Zoning Bd., 270 Md. 478, 312
A.2d 277 (1973); Montgomery County Council v. Pleasants, 266 Md. 462, 295 A.2d
216 (1972); Howard Research & Dev. Corp. v. Zoning Bd., 263 Md. 380, 283 A.2d
150 (1971); Park Constr. Corp. v. Board of County Commrs., 245 Md. 597, 227
A.2d 15 (1967).
In Dunk v. Township of Brighton, 52 Mich. App. 143, 216 N.W.2d 455 (1974),
although the township adopted a land use plan that recommended retaining the
existing 15,000 square foot lot minimum zoning for the area in question, a 40,000
square foot minimum was imposed. Based on the plan and testimony from a health
department official, the court held that the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case
that the 40,000 square foot minimum was unreasonable as applied to the plaintiffs'
property.
159. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968). See 1 N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at§ 26.06. Williams puts Udell in the category of cases that
first equate the comprehensive plan with general zoning map policy and then apply
that policy to determine the validity of individual zoning changes.

938

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:899

preted this statute, which follows the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, to require the adoption of an independent comprehensive
plan. It is, however, willing to find that the land use policies of a
community are expressed in a comprehensive plan, if one exists, as
well as in the zoning ordinance and map. 160 In this case, the village
had continuously zoned the area in which the landowner's parcel was
located for commercial uses, at least since the mid-1930s. In 1968 it
adopted a "developmental policy" as an amendment to its zoning
ordinance that appeared to confirm this zoning. 161 This policy called
for a suburban, low-density community. Most of the small portion of
the village area that was zoned for commercial use was, like the parcel
in Udell, located on the periphery of the community and adjacent to
nonresidential uses in other neighboring communities.
The downzoning had been accomplished very quickly, after it
became apparent that the owner of the parc~l intended to build
commercially as permitted by the existing zoning classification. There
was testimony that the downzoning was accomplished in part to
accommodate the "feeling of the Village" that no extensive commercial use should be permitted in that area. 162 These circumstances led
the court to hold that the downzoning was not "in accordance" with a
comprehensive plan. As the court pointed out, zoning could easily
degenerate into "arbitrary infringements on the property rights of the
landowner. To assure that this does not happen, our courts must
require local zoning authorities to pay more than mock obeisance to
the statutory mandate that zoning be 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' There must be some showing that the change does not
conflict with the community's basic scheme for land use.'' 163 The
problem is no less serious when an upzoning is made at the behest of
a single landowner, a circumstance that led the Pennsylvania court in
Eves to call for comprehensive planning as the basis for a zoning
change. 164
In other cases, zoning amendments inconsistent with the comprehensive plan have been approved. These decisions usually come from
states in which the plan is treated as advisory because the "in accordance" requirement has not been interpreted to require a comprehen160. 21 N.Y.2d at 472, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896. See also
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951) (finding a
comprehensive plan in the general land use needs of the community).
161. 21 N.Y.2d at 471-72, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
162. 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905,288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
163. 21 N.Y.2d at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
164. See text at notes 28-35 supra.
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sive plan external to the zoning ordinance.165 In these states, a subsequent zoning change is accepted as a modification of the plan. The
courts may also emphasize the planning commission's participation in
the zoning change as a reason for upholding a rezoning that is inconsistent with the prepared plan.166
Some cases have also approved floating zone and planned unit
development procedures allowing higher density residential uses, even
though such uses are not consistent with the comprehensive plan and
with previously existing low density zoning in the area. 167 Since
these cases often arise in rural or urbanizing areas, the courts may
correctly perceive that the plan and the low density zoning enacted to
implement it are part of a "holding" strategy properly subject to
revision as the need for more intensive development arises. While
they recognize that the plan could provide guidance for zoning
changes to higher densities, the courts may be convinced that
planned unit development and similar techniques can allow for a
departure from the plan in a particular case. Opportunities for site
plan review under such procedures also may be a factor that prompts
the courts to accept a departure from the plan. Site plan standards
contained in these ordinances usually require the higher density development to be compatible with its surroundings, and give both the
municipality and the courts an opportunity to insist that the development not be intrusive. To the extent that these standards authorize a
review to assure the compatibility of new uses with their surroundings, they meet a principal concern expressed in Fasano. 168
In still other cases, a zoning amendment consistent with the plan
has been judicially approved. While Fasano is probably the strongest
opinion giving weight to the comprehensive plan as support for a
zoning amendment to a more intensive use, other courts have also
165. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Planning & Zoning Commn., 164 Conn. 215, 319 A.2d
376 (1973); Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Commn., 159 Conn. 585, 271 A.2d 319
(1970); Doran Investments v. Muhlenberg Twp., 10 Pa. Commnw. 143, 309 A.2d 450
(1973); Saenger v. Planning Commn., 9 Pa. Commnw. 499, 308 A.2d 175 (1973);
Forks Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. George Calantoni & Sons, Inc., 6 Pa. Commnw. 521,
297 A.2d 164 (1972). Cf. Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines, 26 Ill. App. 3d 586, 325
N.E.2d 345 (1975). See generally 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at§ 26.06.
166. See, e.g., Cheney v. Village 2 At New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81
(1968).
167. See, e.g., Loh v. Town Plan & Zoning Commn., 161 Conn. 32, 282 A.2d 894
(1971); Chrinko v. Township Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221
(1963); Cheney v. Village 2 At New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968);
Doran Inves. v. Muhlenberg Twp., 10 Pa. Commnw. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973). The
ordinance must of course provide sufficient standards and criteria under which the use
can be allowed.
·
168. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.

940

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:899

been willing to consider the authority of the plan in this situation. 100
As in Fasano, these courts have had to consider just how the policies
of the plan should be related to the zoning process, a problem
substantially mooted in cases like Baker where the conflict between
the plan and the ordinance is clear.
This problem is not serious in jurisdictions in which the plan is
mapped in a fairly detailed way. In these jurisdictions, the courts can
apply the plan's mapped land use designations with some precision to
zoning amendments and to other actions that implement the plan.
Whether the courts should also adopt a rule of reason to allow minor
deviations from mapped planning policy is more problematic. 170
Particularly difficult questions of implementation are presented
when the plan is expressed in textual policy form, when the mapping
it contains is highly generalized, or when the plan, though fairly
precise in its mapping designations, allows some freedom of choice to
the agency empowered to implement zoning. The Pennsylvania
supreme court was confronted with the latter situation in Cleaver v.
Board of Adjustment.171 ·While the Pennsylvania courts (apart from
the intimations in Eves) do not require the adoption of an independent comprehensive plan to satisfy the "in accordance" requirement,
the case nevertheless is instructive on the role of the plan as a
justification for zoning amendments.
169. See City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973) (refusal to
rezone was arbitrary in light of land use plan); Ward v. Knippenberg, 416 S.W.2d 746
(Ky. 1967) (plan serves as a guide, and actual location of shopping center in zoning
ordinance need not follow plan exactly); Henze v. Building Inspector, 359 Mass. 754,
269 N.E.2d 711 (1971); Sonneland v. City of Spokane, 4 Wash. App. 865, 484 P.2d
421 (1971). Cf. Montgomery County Council v. Leizman, 268 Md. 621, 303 A.2d
374 (1973) (comprehensive rezoning in accordance with master plan given strong
presumption of validity and correctness). See generally Montgomery v. Board of
County Commrs., 263 Md. 1, 280 A.2d 901 (1971) (zoning amendment consistent
with comprehensive plan was approved when supported by change in neighborhood
conditions); Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 289
A.2d 303 (1972) (failure to rezone was arbitrary and capricious in light of changed
circumstances).
170. Compare Ward v. Knippenberg, 416 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1967) in which a
minor deviation from a comprehensive plan in the mapping of a commercial zone was
not held fatal, with Duddles v. City Council, _ Ore. App. - , - , 535 P.2d
583, 586-89 (1975), in which the court set aside a commercial rezoning when
commercial rezoning was not indicated for that tract but rather for an adjacent parcel.
See also F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, _ Iowa _,
190 N.W.2d 465 (1971); Heller v. Prince George's County, 264 Md. 410, 286 A.2d
772 (1972). For a case in which the policy of the plan was applied to find a
rezoning invalid even though the rezoning was inconsistent with the land use
designated by the plan, see Dustin v. Mayor and Council, 23 Md. App. 389, 328 A.2d
748 (1974).
171. 414 Pa. 367, 375-78, 200 A.2d 408, 413-15 (1964), followed in Schubach v.
Silver, _ Pa. - , _, 336 A.2d 328, 337-38 (1975); Pollock v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment,_ Pa. Commnw.-, _, 342 A.2d 815,820 (1975).
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In Cleaver, the township had rezoned an eleven-acre tract, located
near a suburban Philadelphia railway station and major highway,
from single family residential to apartment use. 172 The tract was
bounded by single family residences and by a large research center.
The plan adopted by the township consisted of general policy proclamations and some policy statements relating to specific areas of land.
Generally, apartments were encouraged throughout the township as
a transitional use between residential and nonresidential areas. Access
to "good highway and rapid transit facilities" was also endorsed for
these developments. The plan then called explicitly for the rezoning
of certain specified tracts near designated railway stations, including
the disputed one, to apartment or professional uses. Neighbors objecting to this rezoning did not challenge these apartment location policies as inappropriate, but complained that the density permitted and
the setbacks required by the rezoning were too generous. No policies
for density or setbacks were contained in the plan.
The court noted the generality of the plan, but held that "[a]
comprehensive plan does not contemplate or require a 'master-plan'
which rigidly provides for or attempts to answer in minute detail
every possible question regarding land utilization or restriction." 173
Since the plan defined a "range of choices" for the zoning of the
property at issue, and the rezoning fell within that range, 174 the court
found that the ordinance accorded with the plan, and that the zoning
was justified by both the plan and attendant circumstances. The
Cleaver court was thus more willing than the Fasano court to credit
the policies of the comprehensive plan without qualification, even
though its interpretation of the plan as an advisory document leaves
room for the court to reject the plan in an appropriate case.175
172. For a map of the environs in this case, see D. MANDELKER, Managing our
Urba11 Environment 916 (2d ed. 1971).
173. 414 Pa. at 375,200 A.2d at 413 (emphasis original).
174. "It is clear that the Tredyffrin Land Use Plan (a) permits a defined range of
choices in the zoning of appellant's property . . ., and (b) does not command
particular requirements of population density or set-back or spacing for apartments
thereon, and (c) clearly envisages and permits a proper zoning of the property here in
question for apartments." 414 Pa. at 378, 200 A.2d at 415 (emphasis original).
175. The Cleaver court addressed the spot zoning objections to the rezoning
independently, but found that the rezoning was consistent with other applicable
zoning in the surrounding area and that the tract was adjacent to the heavily used
railroad tracks. 414 Pa. at 367, 378-80, 200 A.2d at 408, 415-16. Thus, the rezoning in Cleaver could have been independently supported as consistent with uses in the
surrounding area, apart from the policies adopted in the township plan. While the
court's assumption that apartments are properly placed near busy railroad tracks may
be open to question, there was at least enough evidence in the case to indicate that
the rezoning would not introduce an intrusive use into the area (to use the words of
the Fasano decision).
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The Cleaver court was also willing to view the failure of the plan
to deal with density and setback requirements as a reason for not
deeming these issues controlling in passing on the rezoning. It could
be argued, however, that the plan's failure to consider density should
be fatal, since the very purpose of a rezoning like the one in Cleaver is
to increase the density allowed on the rezoned tract. If a plan is
incomplete or inadequate, a court could (and should) reject its
policies for failing to provide an adequate basis for a rezoning amendment. If in this situation the plan does not adequately define the
"range of choices," it should not be entitled to judicial respect. The
same result should be reached when the plan is too vague.
Another issue raised by reliance on the plan to support a rezoning
amendment concerns the extent to which the court should be willing
to accept the developmental policies proposed for the community by
the plan. 176 Cleaver and similar cases have looked to the plan to
determine whether the rezoning amendment is consistent with underlying planning policies. If no regionally significant exclusionary
zoning or kindred issues are raised, the courts should accept the policies of the plan as generally controlling for the limited purpose of
determining whether a zoning amendment that allows a more intensive use serves community purposes or confers an improper windfall on a single landowner.
Finally, some courts have set aside a zoning amendment even
though it was consistent with the plan. Cases decided under the
Maryland change-mistake rule have invalidated these amendments
when there have been no changes in the surrounding land use that
justify the amendment. A leading case is Chapman v. Montgomery
County Council, 177 in which plaintiffs challenged the rezoning from
rural residential to commercial of a 5.8 acre tract in a fast-growing
area of the county. The purpose of the rezoning was to allow
construction of a convenience shopping center, the approval of which
was necessary to avoid an alternative not favored by the planexpansion of another nearby shopping center. Nevertheless, the
court set aside the zoning amendment. It noted that under the
change-mistake rule, "[a] 'Master Plan' is not to be confused as a
substitute for a comprehensive zoning or rezoning map, nor may it be
equated with it in legal significance."178 The substantial growth in
176. For a discussion of this issue in Christine and related Michigan cases, see
text at notes 98-111 supra.
177. 259 Md. 641, 271 A.2d 156 (1970). Cf. Richter v. City of Greenwood
Village, 513 P.2d 241 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973 ), in which the city refused to rezone
despite the recommendations in the master plan.
178. 259 Md. at 643, 271 A.2d at 157.
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the population of the neighborhood, said the court, might justify
additional rezoning to higher residential densities, but was not sufficient to support the shopping center rezoning.
Consideration by the Chapman court of the intrusiveness of the
commercial use in the surrounding residential area as a factor to be
weighed against rezoning reflects the problem raised in Fasano. It
also illustrates the deficiencies of the change-mistake rule, which
substantially discounts the role of the plan in supporting zoning
change. If the plan cannot be used to support zoning changes that
implement the urban pattern it proposes, the community will always
have to zone reactively, after the character of the neighborhood has
changed sufficiently to support zoning amendments to more intensive
uses. 179
Just how these changes can occur is not clear from the Maryland
cases. It is possible, but by no means certain, that the Chapman
court would have allowed a rezoning to commercial uses of a smaller
tract in the neighborhood. Other alternatives might arise from the
inapplicability of the Maryland change-mistake rule to floating
zones180 and to a large-scale comprehensive rezoning of all or part of
a community. 181 Legislation in Maryland now codifies the changemistake rule and lists a series of factors, including the policies of the
comprehensive plan, to be considered in determining whether a
change in conditions has occurred.182 This legislation may encourage recognition of the plan in cases like Chapman, where urban
development has progressed substantially and the application of the
plan's policies through rezoning would help implement a reasonable
growth pattern. As the dissent in Chapman noted, comprehensive
plan revisions and comprehensive rezonings are "expensive, difficult,
and time-consuming." Population continues to grow between these
reformulations, and the comprehensive plan should provide guidance
179. However, a rezoning consistent with a comprehensive plan has been approved when it was supported by a change in neighborhood conditions. See Montgomery v. Board of County Commrs., 263 Md. 1, 280 A.2d 901 (1971). Cf. Board
of County Commrs. v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 215 A.2d 209 (1965).
180. See, e.g., Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248 Md. 386, 237 A.2d
53 (1968).
181. See, e.g., Montgomery County Council v. Leizman, 268 Md. 621, 622, 303
A.2d 374, 375 (1973); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County
Council, 254 Md. 59, 65-66, 254 A.2d 700, 704-05 (1969); McBee v. Baltimore
County, 221 Md. 312, 316-17, 157 A.2d 258,260 (1960); Coppolino v. County Bd. of
Appeals, 23 Md. App. 358, 369-70, 328 A.2d 55, 61 (1974). See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, at 94-95.
182. MD. ANN. CODE art 66B, § 4.05(a) (1970).
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to the local legislative body for meeting development needs that must
be accommodated during this period.183
C.

The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Administrative
Zoning Techniques

Comprehensive planning policies may provide a justification not
only for zoning amendments of the traditional sort, but also for
changes made through floating zones, which sometimes require a
zoning amendment. They may also provide a basis for conditional
use permits and special exceptions, which, unlike floating zones, are
explicitly authorized by the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. 184
As already noted, some courts have been willing to approve a floating
zone even when it is inconsistent with the policies of a plan.186 These
cases will now be examined more closely. There is no adequate
justification for conditional use and floating zone approvals to be
more favored than zoning amendments, since effectuation of the
policies of the plan are at stake in both cases. Consistency with
planning policies should be uniformly required.
An Oregon decision, Archdiocese of Portland v. County of Washington, 186 suggests why some courts have excused floating zones and
conditional uses from conformity with comprehensive planning policies. The county commissioners had denied a request for a conditional use permit to allow the construction of a church, school, and
gymnasium in a residentially zoned area, and the denial was upheld
by the Oregon supreme court. The court's opinion dealt with the
criteria for approval as well as for denial of such a permit request. It
183. 259 Md. at 656, 271 A.2d at 163-64.
184. STANDARD STATE ZoNING ENABLING Acr § 7 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce rev,
ed. 1926).
185. See text at notes 32-35 supra.
186. 254 Ore. 77, 458 P.2d 682 (1969). In State ex rel. Standard Mining & Dev,
Corp. v. City of Auburn, 82 Wash. 2d 321, 510 P.2d 647 (1973), the city's zoning
ordinance provided for gravel mining operations in "any district" if authorized by a
special permit issued by the city council. The reasonableness of the conditions
imposed by the council in granting the special permit was disputed. The court held
that standards to guide the council in imposing conditions on the permit could be
found by looking to the purposes of zoning described in the comprehensive plan, and
need not be stated in the ordinance itself.
A number of cases have upheld floating zones even though not recommended by
the plan. See Loh v. Town Plan & Zoning Commn., 161 Conn. 32, 282 A.2d 894
(1971) (master plan is merely advisory and is not the comprehensive plan which is to
be found in the scheme of the zoning regulations); Sheridan v. Planning Bd., 159
Conn. 1, 266 A.2d 396 (1969) (the court followed the Kozesnik theory, distinguishing the Eves case and noting that the plan was advisory only). Cf. Lutz v. City of
Longview, 83 Wash. 2d 566, 520 P.2d 1374 (1974) (lack of specific guidelines for
PUDs in comprehensive plan did not mean that approval of a PUD was invalid as
spot zoning).
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noted that "[t]he original [zoning] ordinance itself expressly provides for the specified 'conditional uses' which might be made in the
zone." 187 The administrative grant of a conditional use permit thus
does not have an " 'erosive effect on the comprehensive zoning
plan,' " said the court,188 since "[t]he fact that these permissible uses
are pre-defined and have the legislative endorsement of the governing
body of the county as a tentative part of the comprehensive plan for
the area limits the possibility that the Board's action in granting a
permit will be inimical to the interests of the community."189
This language needs interpretation. Zoning ordinance provisions authorizing conditional uses and floating zones must contain
sufficiently precise standards to guide the zoning agency in considering a proposed development. Perhaps the court meant to say that the
inclusion of these criteria in the ordinance obviates any need to rely
on the policies of the comprehensive plan as a guide. This position
might be sound for conditional uses, which are not often markedly
discordant with existing uses in the area in which they are allowed,
but may not apply to floating zones, which may be structured to allow
intensive new development in previously undeveloped areas. If the
floating zone provisions require that the zone be reviewed to determine whether it is compatible with its prospective surrounding area,
the courts might be led to rely on the criteria governing approval
of the floating zone rather than on the policies of the comprehensive plan, even when approval is not consistent with the plan.
Yet a floating zone that is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan
may severely distort planning policies.
This problem of substantial inconsistency might be met through
zoning enabling legislation, which can require that floating zone and
similar approvals, as well as zoning amendments, be consistent with
the plan.190 The same result can be accomplished absent statutory
direction by including a comparable provision in the zoning ordinance. Whatever the explicit mandate, extreme care must be exercised in the judicial review of the floating zone process. When the
uses and densities introduced by the floating zone are not substantially more intensive than those present in the surrounding area, an
187. 254 Ore. at 83, 458 P.2d at 685.
188. 254 Ore. at 85, 458 P.2d at 686, quoting Smith v. County of Washington,
241 Ore. 380,384,406 P.2d 545, 547 (1965).
189. 254 Ore. at 85,458 P.2d at 686 (footnote omitted).
190. See IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 18-7-2-71 (Bums 1974), construed in Suess v.
Vogelgesang, 151 Ind. 631, 281 N.E.2d 536 (1972). This variance statute applies
only to Indianapolis and Marion County. But see Board of Zoning Appeals v. Shell
Oil Co.,_ Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d 636 (1975) (construing statute requiring improvement location permit to conform to master plan).
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ordinance provision mandating the compatability of the floating zone
with existing uses may be relied upon to provide the necessary control
over the approval process. However, when a floating zone is introduced in a previously undeveloped area, or when it substantially
intensifies the uses and densities already present in that area, there is
no reason why a departure from the comprehensive plan should be
allowed.

D. Revision of the Comprehensive Plan To Provide Consistency
with Zoning Amendments and Administrative
Zoning Changes

Courts that will give credence to the policies of a comprehensive
plan in support of a zoning amendment or administrative zoning
change may nevertheless first review the comprehensive plan to determine whether it has been properly enacted and revised. Some courts
have been willing to accept a revision of the comprehensive plan that
was made concurrently with the zoning amendment. 191 If the plan
can be amended piecemeal in order to support a zoning change, the
role of the plan as a comprehensive statement of community planning
policies may be diluted and the planning process may be abused. This
practice may in tum seriously undermine the justification for relying
on the comprehensive plan as a basis for rezoning. Some jurisdictions have therefore prohibited piecemeal rezonings and plan revisions. A number of these require that rezoning amendments be
grouped for consideration during a few specified periods of the year,
or that comprehensive rezonings be carried out frequently, on a
cyclical schedule. 192 Likewise, amendments to the comprehensive
plan could be considered a limited number of times each year. 193
Although grouping several amendments or plan revisions at a particu191. See Wiegel v. Planning & Zoning Commn., 160 Conn. 239, 241-43, 278
A.2d 766, 767-68 (1971); Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Bd., 155 Conn. 205,
230 A.2d 606 (1967); Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208
(1963); Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 632-35, 241 A.2d 81,
84-85 (1968); Furniss v. Lower Merion Township, 412 Pa. 404, 194 A.2d 926
(1963); Donahue v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
Cf. Tierney v. Duris, _Ore.App.-,_, 536 P.2d 435, 438 (1975).
192. See, e.g., Coppolino v. County Bd. of Appeals, 23 Md. App. 358, 369-70, 328
A.2d 55, 61 (1974). The Baltimore County Code provided for periodic consideration
of zoning reclassification petitions; a different section required the Planning Board to
recommend to the Council a complete, countywide zoning map every four years. The
court approved the cyclical consideration of zoning amendments as consistent with
good zoning practice.
193. CAL. Govr. CoDE § 65361 (West 1975). For a recommendation endorsing
this procedure, see Krasnowiecki, Model Land Use Development Code, in MARYLAND
PLANNING AND ZoNING LAW STUDY COMMISSION: FINAL REPORT 53, 109-10 (1969),
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lar time does not entirely remove the danger of ad hoc actions, it may
help to reduce the risk.
Some courts also may be willing to disregard the policies of the
comprehensive plan when a considerable period of time has elapsed
since the plan's adoption and changes in the nature of the community
have made the plan's policies obsolete as applied to a particular
dispute. 194 This approach has its dangers, for it may undercut timing
and growth management programs for which the plan is expected to
provide a framework over a period of many years. Nevertheless,
communities should not be able to escape entirely their plan revision
responsibilities. As an alternative approach, if a plan has not been
revised for a considerable period, a court could presume that the plan
is no longer representative of community policy and could put t1ie
burden on the community to prove the contrary.105
If the community contemplates a revision of the plan to support a
zoning change, its safest course is to undertake an independent and
fully considered amendment of the comprehensive plan. When a
limited plan amendment is made expressly to permit a particular
zoning change, the community risks intensive judicial scrutiny, but
may nevertheless prevail. For example, in Rosenberg v. Planning
Board, 196 the Connecticut supreme court considered the validity of a
city plan amendment intended to support a zoning change. The city
charter made a plan mandatory and prohibited any "use in any area
which is contrary to the general land use established for such area by
the master plan."197 An owner desired rezoning of his land, desig194. See Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d
155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973). A tract of land was rezoned by the village from
single family to multifamily residential. This rezoning was inconsistent with a preexisting comprehensive plan that had not been amended in ten years. Noting that
the proper standard by which to measure the "in conformity" requirement was
current comprehensive planning, the court held that the particulars of the plan (which
could have been amended) might be disregarded since the amendment was in
harmony with the general policy of providing convenient housing near places of
employment. Comprehensive planning, not strict adherence to a particular plan, was
the objective. 33 N.Y.2d at 188-89, 306 N.E.2d at 160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37.
Several problems are raised by this decision. One is that a court taking this
position will be at liberty to disregard an adopted plan under its own view of whether
the plan is outdated. This decision will, in tum, require an analysis by the court of
whether conditions have so changed in the community that the policies of the plan are
no longer to be credited, an analysis that will project the court into a policy-making
role. Once the court decides that the plan can be disregarded, it will likewise be able
to decide on the validity of a zoning change based on its own view of local
development policy, which will not have been considered and evaluated through the
local planning process.
195. This problem could also be handled by a statutory provision periodically
requiring the comprehensive revision of the plan. See note 192 supra.
196. 155 Conn. 636,236 A.2d 895 (1967).
197. 155 Conn. at 637, 236 A2d at 897.
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nated for single family use in both the plan and zoning ordinance, to
permit construction of office and laboratory buildings. He sought
and received a change in the plan's designation of his land as a
preliminary step to the zoning change. In upholding the plan
amendment, the court rejected the argument that the plan may be
amended only to reflect changes in conditions that might have oc•
curred since a previous denial of an analogous proposed amendment.
Otherwise, said the court, "a prime function of the planning board
which is to anticipate and direct the future orderly development of the
city" would be thwarted. 198
Rosenberg allows the planning agency considerable flexibility in
amending the plan to reflect changes in planning policy, but does not
consider the procedures that must be followed in making amendments
to the comprehensive plan. These procedures are critical in any
jurisdiction that ·adopts mandatory planning and requires that zoning
be consistent with its plan. This requirement will be undercut if the
community may arbitrarily revise comprehensive planning policies
without utilizing procedures that guarantee proper consideration of
the revision. This concern may, for example, underlie the Oregon
decisions that have required plan amendments affecting an individual
piece of property to go through a Fasano•type quasi.judicial proce•
dure. 199
Short of requiring quasi-judicial procedures for plan revision, a
court may enforce provisions found in many community charters and
enabling acts that impose strict review and referral procedures on the
comprehensive plan revision process. This position was taken in
Dalton v. City and County of Honolulu, 200 in which the court consid•
ered the validity of a plan and zoning amendment in light of a
provision of the Honolulu charter that required all zoning ordinances
to conform to and implement the general city plan. 201 The coun•
198. 155 Conn. at 639, 236 A.2d at 897-99. Compare dictum in Tierney v. Duris,
_ Ore. App. - , - , 536 P.2d 435, 439 (1975), that "changes would appear
permissible when the original plan was in error, or there has been a change in the
community, or there has been a change in policy, such as could be produced [sic] by
city and county election results." Rosenberg did not require the planning board to
consider the impact of the proposed use on traffic congestion. It held that this
problem is properly for the consideration of the zoning board when the zoning change
is proposed. See 155 Conn. at 640, 236 A.2d at 898.
199. See, e.g., Marggi v. Ruecker, _Ore.App.-, 533 P.2d 1372 (1975).
200. 51 Haw. 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969), discussed in 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note
9, at § 26.12.
201. The charter defined the plan as the council's policy for a future, comprehensive physical development of the city. 51 Haw. at 409, 462 P.2d at 205. It required
that any addition to or change in the general plan be refer~ed to the planning director
and the planning commission for comment. If the commission disapproved or
modified the proposed change, or failed to make its report within 30 days, the
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cil had amended the general plan and the zoning ordinance on
the same day to allow medium-density residential development, without having referred the amendment to the planning director and
planning commission for their advice, as required by the charter. The
court invalidated the plan amendment, holding that the specific procedures required by the charter had to be followed exactly. "These
sections of the charter," said the court, "allow less room for the
exertion of pressure by powerful individuals and institutions." 202
Moreover, the court held specifically that any alteration in the plan
must be accompanied by new studies that evidence a need for additional housing, and that show not only that the housing should be
located at the site in question, but that the proposed location is the
"best site." 203
The Honolulu plan under review in Dalton was quite detailed,
and the effect of that decision elsewhere in the jurisdiction has been
to require detailed amendments to the general plan as a condition to
any zoning amendments based on a change in planning policy, at
least when the city's charter can be so construed. 204 Piecemeal
council could nevertheless adopt it, but only by an affirmative vote of at least two
thirds of its entire membership. 51 Haw. at 412,462 P.2d at 207.
202. 51 Haw. at 416, 462 P.2d at 209.
203. 51 Haw. at 417, 462 P.2d at 209. The authority of Dalton may have been
weakened by a 1972 amendment to the city charter that dropped the word "comprehensive" from the definition of the general plan, as well as the requirement for
detailed studies. Revised Charter of the City and County of Honolulu § 5-408
(1973). But cf. Hall v. City and County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 121,. 530 P.2d 737
(1975), in which the court found that the hearing requirement imposed by Dalton as
condition to the adoption or amendment of the general plan was not satisfied by a
a hearing on one of the detailed plans that the charter authorizes to spell out more
precisely the policies of the general plan. The Honolulu charter authorized a network
of county and sub-county plans that is similar to the planning program adopted in
Montgomery County, Maryland, discussed in note 85 supra. For discussion of these
plans, see LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF HONOLULU, THE CrrrzEN AND TIIE PLANNING
PROCESS: UNDERSTANDING TIIE SYSTEM 2-3 (1974). This planning system will be
modified if a general policy plan now under consideration is adopted. See note 84
supra. A number of cases have upheld the statutory requirement of planning
commission input prior to council action on a zoning change. See, e.g., Colorado
Leisure Products, Inc. v. Johnson, _ Colo. - , 532 P.2d 742 (1975); Houser v.
Board of Commrs., 252 Ind. 301, 247 N.E.2d 670 (1969); Louisville v. McDonald,
470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Frankland v. City of Lake Oswego, 8 Ore. App. 224, 493
P.2d 163 (1972), modified, 267 Ore. 452, 517 P.2d 1042 (1973). Cf. Chrobuck v.
Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 869-71, 480 P.2d 489, 495-96 (1971). But cf.
Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 399-400, 157 S.E.2d 920, 921-22 (1967). The
Kentucky court also requires adjudicative fact-finding. In Kentucky, if the legislative
body makes a zoning change that is contrary to the planning commission's recommendation, the court requires adjudicative fact-finding supported by the record of a trialtype hearing of either the planning commission or the legislative body. See Hays v.
City of Winchester, 495 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1973). See generally Tarlock, supra note
21, at 94-101.
204. For a discussion of the Honolulu situation, see Note, Comprehensive Land
Use Plans and the Consistency Requirement, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 766, 770, 772-75
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amendments to the plan covering very small areas are thus permitted
at any time under the Dalton rule if the procedural and substantive
requirements have been met. This piecemeal amendment process
is subject to abuse, notwithstanding the court's call for long-range
and comprehensive revisions in the plan, if the city's planners are
willing to recommend amendments for individual parcels of land in
order to accommodate would-be developers. Dalton to some extent
anticipates this problem by placing substantive constraints on plan
revisions. Its requirement that the affected parcel must be shown
to be the "best site" echoes the similar requirement imposed on zoning amendments by Fasano.
Other problems of application are created by the Dalton decision.
When a community adopts an especially general policy plan in satisfaction of the comprehensive planning requirement, it may not be
meaningful to require the plan's amendment as a precondition to a
zoning change. To some extent this problem can be alleviated if
communitites are also required to adopt more specific area plans that
elaborate on their generalized planning policies. Dalton-type amendment procedures can then be applied to these area plans.
The Dalton approach may also produce problems in zoning administration, since zoning agencies may resist zoning changes simply
to avoid the time and expense of updating the plan. This problem
can be dealt with if the plan is kept under continuous study and if the
locality takes steps to update it frequently, even with amendments
that are not geographically comprehensive.
Rosenberg and Dalton indicate that the courts have not yet fully
developed the requirements that must be met in the plan revision
process. While most courts will no doubt require adequate plan
amendment procedures, more serious problems are presented by the
suggestion that the courts also review comprehensive plan changes on
their merits. The few courts that have considered this question have
taken different views, not unlike the disagreement in the decisions
reviewing originally adopted comprehensive planning policies. Plan
revisions may stand on a different footing when they are a prelude to
changes in zoning designations. Arguably, affected property owners
and community residents are entitled to judicial review of changes in
planning policies without their having to incur the expense of obtain(1974). How Dalton will be applied to the newly proposed generalized policy plan
that might take the place of the existing detailed plan is not clear. Id. at 781-83.
The drafters of the charter intended the new plan to be a plan stating policies
and objectives, and they intended the burden of the Dalton case to be "lifted" by
authorizing the amendment of the plan by resolution. CrIY AND CouNlY OF HONOLULU, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHARTER COMMN 24 (1972).
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ing or resisting a zoning change. This argument is especially persuasive in states that adopt both mandatory planning and the collateral
requirement that zoning and other land use controls be consistent
with a comprehensive plan independent of the zoning ordinance. In
these states, judicial review of the merits of comprehensive plan
revisions appears justified, assuming that the courts are able and
willing to provide the necessary expertise. As an alternative, administrative review of both plan adoptions and revisions at the regional or
state level might be implemented through legislation, perhaps as an
adjunct to mandatory planning.

V.

MANDATING AND ENFORCING COMPREHENSIVE
PLANNING THROUGH LEGISLATION

Judicial decisions that give weight to the comprehensive plan in
litigation challenging zoning regulations provide support for legal
recognition of the planning process. The implementation of a mandatory planning requirement, however, would raise a number of
complex issues that could best be resolved through revision of state
planning and zoning enabling legislation. State legislators must settle
at least three major issues if they decide to mandate comprehensive
planning: the form and content of the planning process to be required at different governmental levels within the state, the extent to
which consistency should be required between local land use controls
and locally adopted comprehensive plans, and the extent to which
local planning programs should be subject to review and modification by other governmental units. This section will explore these
issues by reviewing recent legislative enactments and proposals that
either give the comprehensive plan some presumptive weight in the
administration of land use controls or make the plan a prerequisite to
the exercise of these controls.
A.

The Statutory Elements of the Comprehensive Plan

Traditionally, American planning enabling legislation has not
contained substantive planning policies, has rarely prescribed the
contents of the plan, and has seldom indicated the goals that the plan
should achieve. Although most legislation does require some
mapped plans, it has otherwise failed to describe the form that the
plan should take. This lack of legislative specificity may in part be
appropriate, since planning occurs in many contexts within a state and
is presently undergoing rapid changes in ·perspective, technique,
and concept. State legislation, therefore, should not rigidly force one
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approach upon planners, but should allow them a choice among the
several available alternatives. 205
A more urgent question is whether planning enabling legislation
should provide some substantive guidance for the planning process,
either by specifying necessary linkages among the statutory planning
elements or by prescribing substantive planning goals. Such a
change would require a significant modification of any legislation
based on the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, which was content to prescribe a shopping list of acceptable plan elements. The
standard act did not indicate what policies the plan was to adopt or
how the enumerated elements were to be combined to produce a plan
that satisfied the statutory mandate. New planning objectives, such
as environmental protection, growth control, and provision of lowincome housing, have increased the complexity of planning. The
concurrent pursuit of these objectives in any planning jurisdiction will
likely produce conflicting planning policies. Legislation should mandate at least the preparation of a local plan in which these policy
conflicts are considered and an attempt is made to resolve them.
Substantive planning policies, however, may best be left for determination through the planning process, subject to a statutory generalized outline of an acceptable planning program.
In modifying planning enabling legislation to provide better
guidelines in the three major areas that seem to demand themgrowth management, environmental protection, and planning for lowincome housing-close attention should be paid to the hierarchy of
planning responsibilities. For example, it might be argued that the
internal distribution of residential densities within municipalities is a
problem for local consideration, while the determination of density
levels and rates of growth for communities within a regional setting
is a state or regional responsibility. Similarly, local planning might
be entrusted to make general decisions on residential patterns, but
the location and density of low-income housing are best determined
at state or regional levels. Planning enabling legislation should indicate which issues are to be assigned to each level of government
within the state, or at least should provide clear guidance for planning decisions that raise issues of regional or statewid~ concern but
have been left for local determination.
State legislation should require, moreover, that local plans consider the growth management problem, and that they develop the
205. State legislatures concerned about the overly vague plans that may be
produced in a policy planning process may wish to circumscribe that process in some
way, perhaps by requiring detailed sub-area plans that give greater specificity to the
textually stated policies of the plan. See note 85 supra.
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linkages among capital facilities programming, land use projections,
and density requirements that are necessary for an adequate growth
control program. A statutory directive of this type is contained in the
Federal Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. 206 State,
regional, and local planning agencies are eligible for federal financial
assistance under the act on the condition that they include in their
comprehensive plans "[a] land-use element which shall include . . .
studies, criteria, standards, and implementing procedures necessary
for effectively guiding and controlling major decisions as to where
growth shall take place within the recipient's boundaries . . . ."207
A similar directive is contained in the Florida Local Government
Comprehensive Planning Act. 208
Whether planning enabling legislation should go any further than
these general directives is problematic. 209 Any statutory attempt to
provide more substantive direction for local growth control policy
might be open to the charge that it creates excessive rigidity. Nevertheless, fairly specific provisions were adopted by the Colorado legislature in 1974. 210 This legislation does not mandate a planning
process at the local level, but delegates to local governments a permit
approval authority over major new public facilities and facility extensions, which have a major impact on the rate and direction of new
growth. Detailed substantive statutory requirements are provided to
guide local governments in considering whether to approve these
projects. While these requirements relate primarily to the need to
protect facilities such as airports and highways from urban congestion, the statute also directs that major extensions of water and sewer
facilities "be permitted in those areas in which the anticipated growth
and development that may occur as a result of such extension can be
206. 40 U.S.C. §§ 460 to 461 (Supp. 1974).
207. 40 U.S.C. § 46l(C)(2) (Supp. 1974).
208. Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1975): ''The future land use plan shall include a statement
of the standards to be followed in the control and distribution of population densities
and building and structure intensity as recommended for the various portions of the
area."
209. One problem is the uncertainty of the constitutional limits of an acceptable
growth control program such as those imposed by the federal right to travel doctrine.
See Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 n.13 (9th Cir.
1975); Comment, The Right To Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local
Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972).
210. In 1974, the Colorado legislature granted to local governmental bodies broad
power both to designate certain areas and activities as being of "state interest," and to
regulate development of the areas and participation in the activities through the
issuance of special permits. CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (Supp.
1975). See Bermingham, 1974 Land Use Legislation in Colorado, 51 DENVER L.J.
467 (1974). Specific criteria for administration of areas and activities of state
interest are included. CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65.1-202 and -204 (Supp. 1975).
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accommodated within the financial and environmental capacity of the
area . . . ." 211
Consideration of environmental problems should also be required
by planning enabling legislation. The Colorado land use legislation
provides detailed substantive requirements to protect environmentally
sensitive areas from potentially harmful development. 212 Elsewhere,
provision has been made for environmental planning through legislation that is explicitly directed to environmental protection. Examples
are several state coastal management statutes, which provide for close
state supervision over development in coastal areas. Some of these
statutes contain a planning component as the basis for the review of
new development. 213 Other legislation not limited to coastal areas
also provides for environmental protection. For example, the ALI
Model Land Development Code would give state planning agencies
authority to designate and regulate areas of critical state concem;214
legislation based on this proposal has been adopted in several
states. 215 The ALI critical areas proposal does not, however, require
211. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-65.1-204(b) (Supp. 1975). While its language
is not absolutely clear, the statute certainly suggests that these projects are to be
approved only when these standards are satisfied. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
24-65.1-204, -402, -501. See also CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-65.1-204(7) (Supp.
1975): "When applicable, or as may otherwise be provided by law, a new community
design shall, at a minimum, provide for transportation, waste disposal, schools, and
other governmental services in a manner that will not overload facilities of existing
communities of the region. Priority shall be given to the development of total
communities which provide for commercial and industrial activity, as well as residences, and for internal transportation and circulation patterns."
212. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-65.1-202(3) (Supp. 1975):
Areas containing, or having a significant impact upon, historical, natural, or
archaeological resources of statewide importance, as determined by the state
historical society, the department of natural resources, and the appropriate
local government, shall be administered by the appropriate state agency in
conjunction with the appropriate local government in a manner that will allow
man to function in harmony with, rather than be destructive to, these resources.
Consideration is to be given to the protection of those areas essential for wildlife habitat. Development in areas containing historical, archaeological, or
natural resources shall be conducted in a manner which will minimize damages
to those resources for future use.
213. See Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113a-100 to
-128 (Supp. 1975) (mandating a local planning and development control process for
coastal areas based on state-adopted directives for the local.planning effort), discussed
in Schoenbaum, The Management of Land and Water Use in the Coastal Zone: A
New Law Is Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C. L. REV. 275 (1974); California
Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West
Supp. 1976); Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§
90.58.010-.930 (Supp. 1974). See also Comment, Coastal Controls in California:
Wave of the Future?, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 463 (1974).
214. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 7, pt. 2 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1975).
215. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 380.05 (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 33103314 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1160.07 to .14 (Supp. 1975). For a
discussion of this legislation, see Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmen-
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a state planning component. This omission should be remedied so
that statewide critical area controls will be based on appropriate state
planning policies.
The drafters of new planning enabling legislation should also
consider means to preserve prime agricultural areas from intrusive
urban growth. Hawaii has pioneered in this field by providing a state
program of direct land use regulation aimed in large part at protecting agricultural land. 2 1& There have also been proposals that a
planning element directed to the preservation of agricultural land be
included in state legislation mandating local planning. 217 While a
policy for the protection of agricultural land would be only one
component of a comprehensive environmental protection program, it
is significant enough to merit inclusion in planning enabling legislation.
A difficulty with growth control and environmental protection
programs is that localities, inadvertently or otherwise, may use these
programs to exclude housing for low-income and other groups. The
courts are becoming increasingly aware of the need for local zoning
regulations to accommodate housing for all income groups. 218 Local
planning must therefore concern itself with the housing issue, both to
meet housing needs and to ensure judicial approval of land use
controls aimed at environmental and growth control. Since local
governments may not be sensitive to this issue, planning enabling
legislation should include substantive provisions requiring a housing
element in local plans; these provisions must require planning for a
balanced supply of housing for all income groups. 219
tal Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 103; Mandelker,
Critical Area Colltrols: A New Dimension in American Land Development Regulation, 41 J . .AM. INST. PLANNERS 21 (1975).
216. See HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 105-1 to 205-6 (Supp. 1975). See Mark, It All
Began in Hawaii, 46 STATE GoVT. 188 (1973). Though the original Hawaii system
was not tied to a state plan, the state legislature has recently adopted an interim land
use guidance policy that requires attention to agricultural preservation. HAWAII REv.
STAT. §§ 205-16 to -16.2.
217. See, e.g., Washington State House Bill No. 168, 44th Regular Sess. § 16(2)
(1975). The bill died in committee.
218. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,
341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
219. There is some statutory precedent for this approach. See note 57 supra. But
cf. Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
A New York State study commission has called for the preparation of a mandatory housing element in local plans to provide a broad range of housing alternatives.
This mandatory housing element would in tum provide a basis for judicial review of
local land use regulation. See REPORT OF nm TEMPORARY STATE COMMN. ON nm
POWERS OF LoCAL GOVERNMENT, STRENGTHENING LoCAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW
YoRK STATE, PART 2, SERVICES, STRUCTURES, AND FINANCE 55-61 (1973).
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In fragmented metropolitan areas, however, it may be difficult to
require each local government in the area to accommodate some
portion of the regional housing need. Nevertheless, the New Jersey
supreme court has recently mandated just such an approach in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel. 220
The court held that, absent some attempt at the regional or state level
to ensure a distribution of housing opportunities that takes regional
needs into account, it is incumbent upon localities to attempt to meet
their fair share of housing for all groups. Even though other courts
may follow suit, this decision highlights the need for planning enabling legislation that will both provide a statutory basis for state and
regional planning for housing needs and will take into account the
varying capacities of local governments to provide for this housing.
State legislation might also establish a basis for integrating regional
fair share housing plans with the housing assistance plans that are
now required by federal community development assistance legislation. 221
B.

The Emerging Legislative Requirement That Zoning and Land
Use Controls Be Consistent with an Independently
Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan

Several states have enacted legislation mandating planning by
local governments, and some of this legislation also requires that local
zoning be consistent with the comprehensive plan once it is adopted. 222 These statutes usually have expanded the list of planning
220. 61 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
221. See text at notes 54-57 supra.
The Model Land Development Code provides a statutory procedure for dealing
with the low-income housing problem that does not require the adoption of a
comprehensive plan at either the state or local levels. Adverse local land use control
decisions affecting such housing could be appealed to a state land use adjudicatory
board with power to reverse or modify the local decision. ALI MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-301(4)(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975). One factor
bearing on the approval of such development is the need for housing that is
reasonably accessible to places of employment ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CODE § 7-402(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975). Another section of the code
contains special review procedures that prohibit the approval of major employment
facilities unless housing is available for employees that is reasonably accessible to the
facilities. ALI MODEL LlND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-305 (Proposed Official Draft,
1975). While this device might be of assistance in meeting low-income housing
needs, it is an incomplete response lacking a planning base for the placement and
supervision of low-income housing developments.
222. See text at notes '223-62 infra. For other legislation mandating a local
plan, see ALAS. STAT. §§ 29.33.070, 29.33.085 (1972); § 29.33.090 (Supp. 1975)
(requiring zoning to be consistent with plan); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 6807(a),
6904 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ l-1002(a)(4)(D), 5-414 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 225-21 (Supp. 1975) (requiring local plans to conform to state plan);
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elements and have made some of them mandatory. Otherwise, the
provisions of the original planning enabling act have been left substantially unchanged. Analysis of some of these statutes may suggest
directions for future legislative experimentation.
California was one of the first states to enact legislation requiring
local governments to adopt a plan. 223 Both mandatory and optional
plan elements are provided in the statute,224 but mandatory substantive planning policies are stipulated only for the housing element. 225
The zoning enabling legislation requires local zoning to be consistent
with an adopted local plan and defines "consistent" in the following
terms: "The various land uses authorized by the ordinance are [to
IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6508, 67-6511 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CoDE § 18-7-2-31
(Bums 1974); S.D. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 11-2-11, 11-6-2 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.427, 15.446 (Supp. 1975).
In Arizona and Maine local planning is not mandatory, but once a plan has been
adopted, local zoning regulations must be consistent with it. .ARI.z. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-462.01 (E) (Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962(1 )(A) (Supp.
1973). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357(2) (Supp. 1976) (planning agency to
prepare zoning ordinance "at any time" after adoption of land use plan).
In Minnesota, the Metropolitan Council for the Twin Cities area is required to
adopt a system plan governing the timing, character, function, location, and projected
capacity and conditions on use for existing or planned metropolitan public facilities,
and for state and federal public facilities to the extent known to the Council. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 473.855 (Supp. 1976). Local governments within the Council's area
are. required to prepare comprehensive plans, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.858, and these
are to be reviewed by the Council for conformity with the metropolitan plan, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 473.175. Official controls, including land use controls, that are
adopted by local governments may not conflict with their comprehensive plan, or permit an activity in conflict with the metropolitan plan. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.865
(2).
The planning agency is required to prepare county plans in Rhode Island and
Washington, but adoption by the governing body is optional. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
45-24-1 to -3 (1956); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.320 (Supp. 1974). See also NEV.
REV. STAT. § 278.640 to .675 (Supp. 1975) (authorizes the governor to prescribe,
amend, and administer land use plans and zoning regulations for any county lands not
subject to comprehensive plans and zoning regulations as of 1975. The governor may
enjoin any development that does not conform to an applicable plan).
See also Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 9(c) (1970). In Maryland, the law specifies
that for a period of five years, an annexing- municipality may not rezone the annexed
land to permit a land use substantially different from that allowed by the land use
plans to which the annexed land was previously subject. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23A, §
9(c) (1970). This provision was upheld in Maryland-National Capital Park &
Planning Commn. v. Mayor & Council, 272 Md. 550, 325 A.2d 748 (1974}.
For a locally adopted mandatory county planning requirement, see CHARTER OF
BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, § 6.05(D)(G) (1974). The Charter requires all zoning governing uses and densities to "comply" with the county land use plan.
For a Canadian solution see OTIOWA REGIONAL COMMUNITY Acr, QUEBEC STAT.,
c. 85. § 142 (1969), as amended, c. 85, § 1 (1974).
223. CAL. GoVT. CoDE § 65300 (West 1974). Advisory guidelines have been
prepared at the state level to assist local governments in the preparation of local
plans. See CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GENERAL
PLAN GUIDELINES ( 1973).
224. CAL. GoVT. CoDE §§ 65302, 65303 (West Supp. 1976).
225. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp. 1976).
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be] compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses and
programs specified in [the] plan." 226 This definition of consistency
may be defective, for it requires only that land uses "authorized"
by the zoning ordinance be related to the plan. Nor does this
language explicitly apply to zoning amendments unless a land use
permitted by an amendment is "authorized" by the zoning ordinance
once the amendment is adopted. This interpretation is consistent
with the apparent intent of the statute.
"Compatibility" is the key concept linking the comprehensive
plan and the zoning ordinance under the California statute. There
have as yet been no reported decisions construing this term, 221 but
some interpretation has been provided in advisory guidelines for
local plan preparation issued by the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations. 228 The Council notes that the comprehensive
plan is generalized and long-range, while the zoning ordinance has
"immediate force and effect on each parcel of land."229 It follows,
says the Council, that "[t]he zoning ordinance should be considered
consistent with the general plan when the allowable uses and standards contained in the text of the ordinance tend to further the
policies of the general plan and do not inhibit or obstruct the attain226. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65860(a) (ii) (West Supp. 1976). Toe California Code
requires subdivisions to be consistent with the general or specific plans of the city or
county. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66473.5 (West Supp. 1976). It further mandates
enactment of a specific plan for the area in which the subdivision is to be included.
CAL. GoVT. CODE § 66474.5 (West Supp. 1976). Finally, under the Code, which
requires that every general plan in California have a housing element, CAL, GOVT,
CODE § 65008 (West Supp. 1976), federally financed housing is also subject to the
housing is to be treated the same as conventionally financed housing, CAL, GOVT,
CODE § 65008 (West Supp. 1976), federally financed housing is also subject to the
consistency requirement unless the city or county has a state approved plan for
federal housing. For an analysis of the history behind the enactment of the zoning
consistency requirement in California, see Catalano & DiMento, Mandating Consistency Between General Plans and Zoning Ordinances: The California Experience, 8
NAT. RES. LAW. 455 (1975).
227. There have been some attorney general opinions. See, e.g., 58 OPS. CAL,
ATIY. GEN. 21 (1975).
See also Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning in the Public Interest v,
Board of Supervisors, No. 6-63218 (Cal. Super., March 12, 1975), in which petitioners successfully challenged the adoption of a new general plan on numerous grounds,
including the failure of the plan to be internally consistent in implementing the
planning elements required by the California statute.
228. This council is a state agency composed of representatives from cities,
counties, school districts, special districts, regional organizations, and state agencies.
Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination among local, regional, state,
and federal agencies. However, the planning guidelines issued by the Council are
only advisory. CALIFORNIA CoUNCU. OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note
223, at 2.
229. CALIFORNIA CoUNCU. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 223,
at II-11.
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ment of those articulated policies."230 The guidelines thus appear to
state a 'frule of reason" for relating the zoning ordinance to the
comprehensive plan that is similar to the position that several courts
have taken on the same issue without the benefit of a statutory
pronouncement. 231
Growth timing problems are not explicitly covered by the Califoruia legislation, although the guidelines suggest that zoning should
"gradually" be revised to reflect the plan's projection of future growth
patterns. 232 Similar problems are created by a provision in the
statute that requires amendment of the zoning ordinance within a
reasonable time in conformance with any plan amendments. 233 Allowance for the gradual revision of the zoning ordinance to conform
to a plan amendment would perhaps be more workable. Greater
flexibility in meeting the zoning consistency provision would also be
provided if the plan consisted of both general plan policies and more
detailed area plans. The detailed plans would be prepared to implement general policies, such as for long-term growth, as they
evolved. 234 Amendment of zoning regulations to conform to the area
plan might then be required within a reasonable period of time after it
was adopted. The statute could also specify that a community might
meet the consistency requirement through the adoption of a floating
zone, planned unit development, or similar procedure. These administrative zoning techniques could be used to make any zoning changes
needed to conform to the policies of the plan.
Under the California law, compliance with the statutory consistency requirement may be enforced through a court action brought by
a resident or property owner in the municipality. 235 This provision
has been interpreted broadly by the state's attorney general, who has
230. CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 223,
at II-13.
231. But cf. Roseta v. Cl;mnty of Washington, 254 Ore. 161,458 P.2d 405 (1969),
in which the court suggested that a planning policy generally designating an area for
residential use did not justify a zoning amendment that shifted a lot in the area from
a single family to a multi-family classification.
232. "The zoning ordinance, being current and precise, reflects the existing phase
of land development, but should gradually follow the general plan into the future as
appropriate in relation to timing and sequence of uses. Thus it would be inconsistent
with the plan to zone a large area of existing low intensity use . . • [for high
intensity] scattered uses [that] might .•. contravene a general plan policy calling
for compact urban development." CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, supra note 223, at II-12.
233. CAL. GOVT. CODE§ 65860(c) (West Supp. 1976).
234. There is explicit statutory authority in California for this type of plan.
CAL. GOVT. CODE§ 65450 (West 1966) to 65452 {West.Supp. 1976).
235. CAL. GoVT. CODE§ 65860(b) (West Supp. 1976).

960

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:899

ruled that the cause of action authorized by the statute arises when
the zoning ordinance is inconsistent with the plan, when there is no
adopted plan, or when a plan does not include all of the required
statutory elements. 236 This ruling raises the question of whether a
court is competent to grant relief for each of these violations. The
attorney general suggests that a court can always retain jurisdiction of
the suit to enforce compliance with the consistency requirement and
can enjoin the issuance of building permits or any other zoning action
until the requirement has been met. 237 This approach has been
taken by the Supreme Court of Oregon in enforcing a plan consistency requirement that was judicially imposed on that state's
cities. 238
The California attorney general has also ruled that, while a court
cannot require a community to adopt specific substantive planning
policies that the court might consider desirable, it can at least order
the preparation of a plan containing whatever policies the locality
prefers. 239 Since the California legislation contains a substantive
mandate that the required housing element in local plans provide a
reasonable balance of housing for all segments of the community, a
court could also inspect that element to determine whether the plan
has been faithful to the statutory directive.
Florida has recently adopted a consistency provision that is both
more focused and more extensive in scope than that of California.
The Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of
1975240 mandates planning by counties, municipalities, and special
districts. County plans are to govern within the limits of municipalities and special districts that fail to prepare plans, while the state
planning agency may impose its own plan in any county that does not
complete one by a fixed statutory deadline. 241 Mandatory and op236. 58 OPS. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 21, 25, 26 (1975).
237. 58 OPs. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 21, 26 (1975). Since the opinion states that the
court may enjoin the issuance of building permits until the plan is adopted, the
inference is that the court may also retain jurisdiction until the steps leading to the
adoption of the plan have been completed.
238. See Baker v. City of Milwaukie, - Ore.-, 533 P.2d 772 (1975). Without
the benefit of a statutory provision, the court held that a mandamus action was
available to a resident of the community to enforce zoning consistency with a master
plan.
239. 58 OPS. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 21, 26 (1975). The opinion states that adoption
of the statutorily required constituent elements of the plan can be mandated. Of
course, the locality can adopt whatever policies it chooses except in the area of
housing for which the planning statute mandates substantive policies.
240. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.~161-.3211 (Supp. 1975).
241. Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 163.3167(4) (Supp. 1975). The Act provides that a county plan recom-
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tional elements are prescribed for all plans; these include a mandatory
housing element that must provide for low- and moderate-income
housing needs. There is some guidance for the preparation of
growth control programs, and the statute lists the coordination of the
various planning elements as a major goal of the planning process. 242
This statutory comprehensive planning framework provides the
basis for an extensive consistency provision that is directed both to
development by government agencies and to local land use regulations: "After a comprehensive plan . . . has been adopted . . . all
development undertaken by, and all actions taken in regard to development orders by, [sic] governmental agencies in regard to land
covered by such plan . . . shall be consistent with such plan . . . .
All land development regulations enacted or amended shall be consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan . . . ." 243 This provision is reinforced by one stating that it is the intent of the act that
local land development regulations implement the comprehensive
plan, 244 and by another authorizing judicial review of the relationship between the comprehensive plan and implementing governmental actions or land development regulations, in any litigation challenging these actions or regulations. 245 Land development regulations include zoning, subdivision controls, and all other measures
"controlling the development of land." 246
The Florida statute's extension of the consistency requirement to
land development regulations other than the zoning ordinance, and its
explicit inclusion of amendments to these regulations, are major
innovations. Perhaps even more far-reaching, however, is its application of the policies of the plan to "development orders" by governmental agencies. A "development order" is defined as "any order
granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a
development permit." 247 This section apparently means that all govmended by the state planning agency must be adopted by the state Administration
Commission, which consists of the governor and cabinet. FLA. SrAT. ANN. §
163.3167(5) (Supp. 1975). See generally E. BARTI.EY, LocAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ACT OF 1975: AN INFORMATIONAL SUMMARY (1975).
242. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3177(2) (Supp. 1975).
243. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3194(1) (Supp. 1975).
244. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3201 (Supp. 1975).
245. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3194(3)(a) (Supp. 1975).
246. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3194(2)(b) (Supp. 1975).
247. FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 163.3164(5) (Supp. 1975). This definition appears to be
borrowed from a like definition contained in ALI MoDEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE
§ 1-201 (13) (Proposed Official Draft No. 6, 1975). It should be noted that the
Model Code does not require the adoption of local zoning or similar ordinances in
order to regulate development. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-101
(Proposed Official Draft No. 6, 1975).
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ernmental authorizations of private land development must be consistent with the policies of the plan whether they are made under
zoning or some other land development control procedure. The
Florida act's requirement that governmental development conform
to an adopted plan is also a significant innovation. This provision,
which parallels an English one,248 departs from the, traditional view
that development by governmental agencies is not generally subject to
zoning controls. 249
A more limited plan consistency provision is contained in the
Kentucky planning enabling act, which permits the enactment of a
zoning ordinance after the objectives of a comprehensive plan have
been enunicated. 25 ° Complete preparation of the plan itself is not
required. Once the zoning ordinance has been adopted, the following consistency requirement for zoning amendments is provided
by the statute:
Before any map amendment is granted, the planning commission or
the legislative body must find that the map amendment is in agreement with the community's comprehensive plan, or, in the absence of
such a finding, that one or more of the following apply . . . .
( 1) That the original zoning classification given to the property was
inappropriate or improper.
(2) That there have been major changes of an economic, physical
or social nature within the area involved which were not anticipated
248. See N. ROBERTS, THE REFORM OF PLANNING I.Aw 65-75 (1976); Hagman,
Articles 1 and 2 of A Model Land Development Code: The English Are Coming, 1971
LAND-USE CONTROLS ANN. 3. Similarly, development by local authorities and
"statutory undertakers," i.e., certain public service corporations, is subject to regulation under the English law. See J. CULLINGWORIB, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING
IN BRITAIN 90-92 (4th ed. 1972).
249. See generally Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 316 (1961).
Under the Florida law, governmental agencies are defined to include federal, state,
local, and specific district agencies. The applicability of the consistency provision to
development by federal agencies is questionable in view of federal sovereign immunity. See Comment, Preemption of Local Zoning by Federal Lessee, 1971 URBAN L.
ANN. 200.
250. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.201 (1971). The Act imposes four minimum
requirements for the comprehensive plan: (1) a statement of goals, objectives, policies and standards to guide physical, economic, and social development; (2) a land
use plan projecting future uses; (3) a transportation plan; and (4) a community
facilities plan, again projecting future needs. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.187 (1971),
It also requires the substantive elements of the plan to be based on a specified
study process. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.191 (1971). To ensure further that the
plan will not merely perpetuate existing land use characteristics, the Act requires the
planning commission to adopt a statement of objectives and principles to guide an
ongoing planning and implementation process, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.193
(1971), and imposes a public hearing requirement. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.197
(1971). See Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of K.R.S. Chapter 100, 56 KY. L.J. 556, 58182 (1968).
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in the community's comprehensive plan and which have substantially
altered the basic character of such area. 251

This provision imposes a plan consistency requirement similar to the
Maryland change-mistake rule, which invalidates a zoning amendment consistent with the plan in areas where no change in conditions
has occurred. 252 The Kentucky statute, however, merely requires
that the planning commission or legislative body make a finding of
plan consistency when there has been no change in conditions.
The Kentucky statute was given a literal reading by the state's
highest court in a case in which the challenged zoning amendment
was inconsistent with the policies of the plan as initially adopted and
a supporting plan amendment had been improperly approved. 253 The
court first held that the adoption of a land use element in the plan,
required by the Kentucky statute, is a prerequisite to the validity of a
zoning amendment that is justified by the plan. It then held that
plans could be amended only by following the formal planning study
and hearing requirements of the statute. 254 Since these procedures
had not been followed in amending the plan, and there had been
no change in conditions, the amendment was struck down.
Another consistency requirement is contained in the Nebraska
zoning enabling legislation, which applies only to counties, and which
provides that "[z]oning regulations shall be adopted or amended by
the county board only after the adoption of the county comprehensive
development plan by the county board and the receipt of the planning
commission's specific recommendations. Such zoning regulations
shall be consistent with the comprehensive development plan and
designed for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, . · . . and
welfare of the . . . inhabitants of Nebraska, including . . . specific
[zoning] purposes."255 This statute is more far-reaching than the
251. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.213 (1971). This section of the statute appears
to codify Hodge v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1962). Bellemead Co. v. Priddle,
503 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1974) construed this legislation broadly and held that it
authorized planned neighborhood development units (floating zones). See Fritts v.
Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1971); Tarlock, supra note 21, at 587-89, 594.
252. See text at notes 131-134 supra.
253. See Hines v. Pinchback-Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492 (Ky.
1974).
254. This holding echoes the Dalton rationale, discussed in text at notes 200-04
supra.
255. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-114.03 (1974) (fourteen purposes are enumerated).
In addition, in all villages and the larger cities, a zoning ordinance may be adopted
only after the municipal legislative body has adopted a comprehensive plan. Neb.
LB. 504 § 1 (1974), as amended, NEs-. REv. STAT. § 19-901 (Supp. 1975). The
1975 amendment to this section removed any suggestion from the statute that the
comprehensive plan was intended to be advisory. See Letter from Sen. Douglas K.
Berenter to Daniel R. Mandelker, Sept. 19, 1975 (on file with author).
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Kentucky law, for it applies to zoning ordinance adoptions as well
as to amendments. It also requires that both adoptions and amendments be referred to the planning commission for its recommendations; the commission presumably would determine whether the proposed zoning measure was compatible with the policies of the plan.
This statute was applied by the Nebraska supreme court in a case
considering a challenge to a rezoning in a county that had not
adopted a comprehensive plan. 266 The court held that the statute
applied immediately upon enactment to all existing zoning ordinances257 and that a lapse of almost four years without county
adoption of a comprehensive plan was unreasonable. 258 The rezoning was set aside.
The zoning statutes in these four states delegate enforcement of
the consistency requirement to the courts. Legislatures should provide as much direction as possible for judicial enforcement without
placing excessively restrictive limitations on local governments. Particular attention should be paid to the statutory specification of
required and optional planning elements and to the- linkages among
these elements. This problem of legislative direction is partially
addressed by the Kentucky statute, which errs on the conservative
side by requiring only the adoption of planning objectives as a
condition to the enactment of a zoning ordinance. Broader legislation, such as the California law, links the zoning power to the adoption of all of the required elements of the plan.
The problem of phasing in the consistency requirement also
requires more attention. The California legislation resolved this
problem by delaying the date ~n which the statute adopting the requirement took effect, in order to provide time for the adoption of
local plans. 259 Kentucky's provision for the enactment of interim
zoning ordinances pending adoption of the land use plan's objectives
is an alternative approach. 260 A time limit for the adoption of the
See also NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 84-152 (Supp. 1975), requiring a county containing a
city of the first class to have prepared a comprehensive plan by July 1, 1977. By the
same date, any county in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area may "prepare,
adopt, and enforce zoning and subdivisions regulations that are based upon a comprehensive development plan • . ." for any municipality that has not adopted such
regulations and has not organized and staffed to enforce them. NEB, REv. STAT. §
84-151 (Supp. 1975).
256. See Bagley v. County of Sarpy, 189 Neb. 393,202 N.W.2d 841 (1972) and a
later case, Deans v. West, 189 Neb. 518,203 N.W.2d 504 (1973).
257. 189 Neb. at 394-95, 202 N.W.2d at 842-43.
258. 189 Neb. at 395, 202 N.W.2d at 843.
259. CAL. GOVT. CODE§ 65860(c) (West Supp. 1975).
260. KY. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 100.334 (1971). This provision applies when the

April 1976]

Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan

965

plan could restrict the period during which interim zoning ordinances
are permitted.
Defining the scope of the consistency requirement presents yet
another problem. Preferably, the requirement should be stated
broadly enough to be applicable to the entire zoning and land use
control process. A more limited requirement, like the Kentucky
statute that applies just to map amendments, is undesirable. Consistency with the plan should be required not only for map amendments but also for variances, conditional use permits, and floating
zones and other administrative zoning procedures. 261
Even after the scope of the requirement has been determined, the
meaning of "consistency," which only the California and Florida laws
attempt to define, remains a problem. A definition should be provided that contains both a spatial and a timing dimension. Zoning
action should be made to comply with the spatial policies contained in
the plan, whether they are specified on a map or by textual statement.
The timing problem is also critical, for in many cases the plan will
provide for land use changes at some future time, after development
in the community has further progressed and been intensified. The
California commission's planning guidelines suggest phasing zoning
amendments to shift land use categories to more intensive uses as the
times specified in the plan for the development of selected areas
approach. 262 This method deserves legislative consideration. Problems also arise when the owners of land on which development has
been deferred under the plan's timing policy object to zoning ordinances that restrict development in the interim period. The Ramapo
case provides important support for deferring development in accordance with local timing plans; the right to do so should explicitly be
recognized in the legislative definition of consistency.

VJ.

ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATORY PLANNING
THROUGH STATE AND REGIONAL REVIEW

Judicial enforcement of mandatory planning and consistency requirements depends on the initiative of local residents and property
owners in demanding compliance with the statute, as well as on the
commission "is conducting" or "in good faith is preparing to conduct" the studies
required for a comprehensive plan.
261. See note 190 supra. In addition, see Cow Hollow Improvement Club v.
Board of Permit Appeals, 245 Cal. App. 2d 160, 53 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1966) (variance); Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 252 Ind. 56, 245 N.E.2d 337 (1969)
(variance); Crane v. Board of County Commrs., 175 Neb. 568, 122 N.W.2d 520
(1963) (conditional use); Jacobi v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 413 Pa. 286, 196 A.2d
742 (1964) (conditional use); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 372 (1971).
262. CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 223.
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willingness of the courts to interpret liberally the planning and zoning
consistency provisions. Even courts inclined to take a broad view of
the statute may be circumscribed in the relief that they can give. For
example, the Nebraska and Kentucky courts were compelled to issue
a blanket injunction of local zoning actions in order to enforce the
statutory mandate. As an alternative to judicial enforcement of the
mandatory planning and consistency requirement, the planning statute could provide for state or regional administrative review of local
land use planning and controls. This review might provide greater
assurance both that local controls are consistent with local planning,
·and that local planning is consistent with state and regional policies.
A limited statutory procedure for state level review of local plans
has been provided in the ALI Model Land Development Code. 203
While the Code has taken the position that both state and local
planning should remain optional, it would bar the adoption of certain
sophisticated local land development control regulations, such as
planned unit development ordinances, in the absence of a local comprehensive plan. 264 This provision is viewed as an incentive to
localities to engage in land use planning. The Code would also allow
state planning agencies to review local comprehensive plans (but not
local development control ordinances) once a state plan has been
adopted. If the state agency disapproved a local plan, "no aspect of
the [disapproved plan would] be entitled to any weight in support of
the validity of any action of the local government under this Code." 20 G
This provision would, on its face, bar the courts from considering a
disapproved plan as support for local land use control actions, even
when the Code did not make those actions dependent on the plan.
Perhaps even more importantly, it is implicit in the Code that plan
disapproval would mean that those local land development control
powers that are dependent on a local plan could not validly be
exercised at all.
The Code's judicial review article also gives weight to the state
plan. It provides that, "[i]n a proceeding concerning the relationship
263. The discussion of state administrative procedures for the review of local
plans that follows is based in part on a chapter in a forthcoming treatise by the
· author on national and state land development controls.
264. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODB § 2-212 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1975).
265. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 8-502(3) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1975).
See also Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, which
provides that the state planning agency may make recommendations for the modification of local plans insofar as these plans affect state planning policies or the
responsibility of state agencies, but these recommendations need not be accepted by
the local government. Fu. STAT. ANN. § 163.3184(2) (Supp. 1975).
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of an order, rule or ordinance, to the public health, safety, or welfare,
the court shall give due weight . . . to the consistency of the challenged action with the applicable state . . . Land Development
Plan." 266 This section would apply to any local land development
control action and to those state land development regulations that
implement the policies of a state plan.
The Code thus makes the judicial presumptions accorded land
development control actions dependent upon whether the actions are
consistent with a state plan. By relying on favorable judicial presumptions, the Code hopes indirectly to encourage compliance with
state planning policies. This approach, which is consistent with the
ALI's decision not to mandate a comprehensive planning process,
stops distressingly short of full administrative review at the state level
of local plans and ordinances. It is at best a weak compromise.
More stringent state administrative procedures to ensure that local
plans and land use controls are consistent with state plans have now
been provided in legislation enacted in Oregon and Wyoming. 267 The
broader Oregon statute requires that all cities and counties in the state
engage in comprehensive planning and "[e]nact zoning, subdivision
and other ordinance or regulations to implement their comprehensive
plans."268 The comprehensive plan is defined in conventional terms
as a "land use map and policy statement . . . [covering] . . . all
functional and natural systems and activities relating to the use of
lands . . . ." 269 There is no further attempt to delineate precisely
the elements to be contained in comprehensive plans.
Planning is also mandated at the state level in Oregon through a
state Land Conservation and Development Commission, authorized
to "[e]stablish state-wide planning goals consistent with regional,
county and city concerns"270 and to "[p]repare state-wide planning
guidelines." 271 In developing its goals and guidelines, the Commission is to "consider" the existing plans of state agencies and local
governments. It is also to give "priority consideration" to areas and
266. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-110(3) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1975). This provision is further explained in notes to the Code that indicate
that courts are to pay "special attention" to the plan. ALI MODEL l..AND DEVELOPMENT CoDE, at 493. "No negative implication is intended by calling attention to
these facts. The court may • • • give special attention to other facts and may • • •
draw no adverse conclusion from the absence of a plan." ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE, at 493-94.
267. For the history of the development and enactment of the Oregon law, see C.
LITTLE, Tlrn NEW OREGON TRAIL (1974).
268. ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2}(b) (1975).
269. ORE. REV. STAT.§ 197.015(4) (1975).
270. ORE. REV. STAT.§ 197.404(2}(a) (1975).
271. ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.040(2) (d) (1975).
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activities designated by the statute as being of more than local significance. One such activity is the placement of public facilities, which
requires a permit from the Commission, while significant areas include tracts adjacent to freeway interchanges and such environmentally sensitive zones as wetlands, wilderness areas, flood plains, and
agricultural land. 272 By focusing the Commission's attention on key
areas and facilities, the statute presumably intends to encourage the
preparation of state planning goals and guidelines relating to these
important determinants of growth and their environmental impact.
The state goals and guidelines are not intended to be technical
directives that simply assist localities in their conduct of the planning
process. They are to function instead much like goal statements in
policy plans, and to provide generalized principles for the guidance of
land development within the state.
One year after the Commission has adopted state planning goals
and guidelines, it must review all state agency, city, county, and
special district comprehensive plans and land use controls to determine their consistency with the state "goals." 278 The statute does not
require consistency with state "guidelines." Nor are the goals and
guidelines, and the types of policies to be included in them, defined in
the statute. The available legislative history indicates only that the
"goals" are to have "the full force of authority of the state to achieve
the purposes" of the statute, while the "[g]uidelines . . . are suggested directions that would aid local governments in activating the
mandated goals." 274 This interpretation has been accepted by the
Commission. It has adopted a set of generalized goals, covering
topics ranging from the protection of environmental quality and
resources to the provision of public facilities and services, on which to
base its review of local government planning and plan implementation programs. Significantly, the goals call for an orderly transition
from rural to urban land uses through the establishment of expansion
boundaries around existing urban areas and list a series of factors to
be considered in reviewing conversion of agricultural land to urban
use. 275 The Commission has also promulgated more specific "guidelines" for the implementation of the goals.
The Commission is endowed with powers of administrative review, modification, and enforcement of local plans and ordinances.
272. ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.230 (1975).
273. See ORE. REv. STAT.§ 197.325 (1975).
274. OREGON LAND CoNSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMN,,

STATEWIDE LAND
USE GOALS, GUIDELINES, AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER GORGE AS A CRmCAL AREA 1

(1974).
275. See id. Goal 9.
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On its own motion, the Commission may prescribe and, if necessary,
may "amend and administer" local plans and controls that do not
comply with state planning goals. 276 It may enjoin any building or
land use that fails to conform with a local comprehensive plan or land
use regulation. 277 On petition by a local government or state agency,
the Commission also may review any local plan, land use regulation,
or action for consistency with statewide planning goals. 278 Orders
entered by the Commission in a review proceeding are enforceable by
the state courts.
A regional planning agency for the Portland metropolitan area
has been created by another Oregon statute. 279 This agency is authorized to adopt "regional land use planning goals and objectives,"
to prepare a plan for the region in conformity with these goals and
objectives, to review local comprehensive plans and land use regulations, and to make recommendations to local planning bodies. 280
Goals and objectives adopted by the regional commission apparently
are subject to review by the state commission for compliance with the
state planning goals. 281
Wyoming has adopted similar state and local planning and plan
review legislation, which provides that "[a]ll local governments shall
develop a land use plan within their jurisdiction. The plans shall be
consistent with established state guidelines and be subject to review
276. ORE. REV. STAT.§ 197.325(1) (1973). The statute also authorizes counties
to review all comprehensive plans within the county and advise the government or
agency preparing each plan whether it is consistent with statewide planning goals.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 197.255 (1973). Counties are also responsible for coordinating all
planning activities affecting land use within their boundaries "to assure an integrated
comprehensive plan for the entire area of the county." ORE. REv. STAT. §
197.190(1) (1973 ). The statute exempts the city of Portland from this provision.
This review and coordination function may also be assumed by a voluntarily formed
regional planning agency or a council of governments. Counties and cities representing a majority of the population in the area may petition the State Land Conservation
and Development Commission for permission to form a regional planning agency.
The regional planning agency shall be established if the Commission "finds that the
area described in the petition forms a reasonable planning unit" and the majority
votes to create the agency. A voluntary association of local governments may
perform the review if each county and a majority of cities ratify a resolution adopted
by the association authorizing this-function. ORE. REv. STAT. § 197.190(3), (4)
(1973).
277. ORE.. REv. STAT.§§ 215.510(3), 215.535 (1973).
278. ORE. REv. STAT. § 197.300(1) (1973). Under § 197.305 this review shall
be based on the administrative record prepared with respect to the plan or action
being challenged. "In conflict" is the § 197.300(1) term for "inconsiste1,1t." A
petition for review may also be filed by "any person or group of persons whose
interests are substantially affected." ORE. REV. STAT.§ 197.300(1)(d) (1973).
279. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.705 to -.795 (1973).
280. ORE. RE.v. STAT.§ 197.755(1) (1973).
281. ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.300 (1973).
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and approval by the [state land use] commission."282 The commission in turn is to adopt statewide "land use goals, policies and
guidelines." 283 Local plans need only be consistent with the state
"guidelines." All of the relevant terms are defined by the act, though
not in a manner that removes all doubts about their nature and
significance. 284 A "guideline" is defined, for example, as "a checklist
of methods through which a land use policy is established," 285 though
precisely what a "checklist" should contain is not made clear. The
Wyoming statute, unlike the Oregon law, does not endow the state
commission with the power to modify local plans and land use
controls.
The Oregon and Wyoming statutes are notable for the innovative
manner in which they provide a substantive basis for the review of
local planning and (in Oregon) land use controls. Implicitly in
Oregon and explicitly in Wyoming, the goals and guidelines that are
prepared at the state level are not to be a substitute for a state plan; in
Wyoming a state land use plan must be developed by the commission
after its adoption of the state goals, guidelines, and policies. 286
The legislation of both states avoids the delay in implementation
that would arise if state review of local planning and land use controls
were to be deferred until after preparation of a state plan. Plans that
contain a fully articulated set of proposals for the development of the
state require substantial expenditures of time and money. State goals
and guidelines containing more generalized policies may provide
adequate review standards in the interim, providing they can achieve
sufficient precision and substance. The Oregon and Wyoming statutes may thus furnish innovative means of accommodating policy
planning, increasingly recognized as a replacement for the more
conventional mapped plan, to a procedure for reviewing the adequacy
of local planning and plan implementation.
State and regional administrative review procedures like those
adopted in Oregon and Washington have several advantages over
purely judicial techniques for enforcing consistency requirements under mandatory planning legislation. Administrative review need not
rely on the initiative and resources of private litigants. Moreover, an
282.
283.
284.
285.

WYO.
WYO.
WYO.
WYO.

STAT. ANN.§
STAT. ANN. §
STAT. ANN.§
STAT. ANN.§

9-856(a) (Supp. 1975).
9-853(a) (vi) (Supp. 1975).
9-850 (Supp. 1975).
9-850(g) (Supp. 1975).
286. Presumably, however, local planning and land use controls are to be reviewed for conformity only with the state planning goals and guidelines after the state
land use has been prepared. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-853(a)(vii) (Supp. 1975).
Failure to require reference to the state plan once it has been adopted is arguably a
weakness of this statutory scheme.
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administrative body can readily take cognizance of state and regional
concerns and can comprehensively review local plans and regulations, while the perspective of a court is necessarily limited in litigation over a specific local action. Reliance on a state or regional
agency to adopt policies that implement the state's planning legislation will also avoid the rigidity that would occur if legislatures attempted to include substantive state planning policies in state planning legislation. 287
Several statutory requirements are necessary to provide· for adequate administrative review. Though the requirement that local regulations and plans be consistent is generally found to be implicit in
statutes providing for administrative review, explicit consistency
provisions are desirable. The statute should also make administrative review of local land use regulations mandatory and should provide the agency with sufficient review and enforcement authority.
Oregon's statutory authority for administrative amendment of local
plans and regulations provides an example of this approach. State
and regional administrative review, implemented through appropriate legislation, should be the primary tool for shaping local planning
to the requirements of state planning policies and statutes and for
conforming local land use controls to adopted local plans.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

While planning theorists and practitioners have long advocated
the importance of comprehensive planning to land use control, until
recently courts and legislatures have accorded no more than minimal
recognition to the comprehensive plan. The problem was created,
in part, by the equivocal approach toward the comprehensive planning requirement taken by the drafters of the early model planning
and zoning enabling legislation. This equivocation accounted for the
ambiguous "in accordance" requirement of the early model legislation
that allowed courts to assume that the zoning process alone could
provide a rational and binding framework for local land use controls.
Most courts took a restricted view of the statutory requirement and
allowed a comprehensive and rationally developed zoning ordinance
to substitute for an independently adopted comprehensive plan.
In recent years, an increasing number of courts have conceded a
greater role for the comprehensive plan in zoning administration.
State legislatures have more frequently mandated that local governments engage in a comprehensive planning process, and some have
287. In some critical areas such as low-income housing, ];J.owever, legislative
adoption of substantive planning policies is desirable. See text at notes 49-57 supra.
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also required that local zoning and land use regulations be consistent
with an adopted local plan. This article has argued, for several reasons, that this trend in judicial decisions and in planning and zoning
legislation is appropriate and should be accelerated.
At the local level, mandatory comprehensive planning provides a
policy basis for the land use control process to help ensure that the
process has internal consistency. In the absence of a local comprehensive plan, zoning and rezoning actions by local governments may
be ad hoc and arbitrary. It is principally this concern that has moved
courts to accord a greater role to the comprehensive plan as a. check
on local zoning administration. The need for such a check is especially acute in outlying areas that are undergoing urbanization. 288
Many communities in these areas now use zoning to create "holding
zones" for their undeveloped sections, and land use policy is made as
developments are approved through zoning amendments and discretionary zoning procedures. In the absence of a comprehensive plan,
this policy-making procedure is particularly subject to arbitrariness.
Judicial and legislative insistence on mandatory planning as a
condition to the exercise of local land use controls will require
changes in the administration of these controls. For example, the
requirement of consistency with the plan may compel the use of
quasi-judicial procedures; such as employment of hearing examiners,
for making changes in local land use regulations, since an adequate
factual record may be necessary to determine consistency upon review. In addition, greater financial assistance to local governments
will be required to enable them to prepare and implement the necessary planning policies and regulations. While the federal government
will probably continue to provide this assistance, state governments
have a financial responsibility as well. Wyoming, for example, has
initiated a program of state grants-in-aid for local land use planning.
Without adequate financial support for local planning and plan implementation, the legal mandate for comprehensive planning will not
have its intended beneficial effect.
Mandatory local comprehensive planning can do more than provide a policy base necessary for achieving internal consistency in the
administration of local land use control programs. Local planning
and plan implementation efforts should be made responsive to state
and regional needs, especially in the areas of low-income housing,
environmental protection, and growth control management of the
transition from rural to urban land uses. These concerns create con288. See generally 1969

REPORT,

at 203-07.
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flicting pressures on the land use planning and control process that
transcend local jurisdictions. The local comprehensive plan, executed and implemented under adequate statutory guidance, can help
to resolve these conflicts.
To insure the accommodation of regional and state needs, however, more broadly based planning is necessary. This point is
best illustrated by the New Jersey supreme court's mandate in Mount
Laurel that developing municipalities in the state consider regional
housing needs. 289 While the court was aware that a proper regional
housing program may not necessarily include the provision of an adequate range of housing in each municipality in a metropolitan region,
it was unable to require a regional solution. A truly regional solution
demands legislation creating a state or regional planning authority.
Comprehensive planning by this body could both determine the regional need for low- and moderate-income housing and assure that
all municipalities in which a need exists have met their fair share
of the total.
Legislation mandating local planning should also provide a
method for reviewing local planning and plan implementation to verify that the interests of the state and region are properly considered.
State and regional review of local planning is provided by the Oregon
and Wyoming legislation. Such a review process can also ease the
problem of establishing adequate substantive statutory standards for
local comprehensive planning. Except in the area of low-income
housing, where substantive legislative guidance is necessary, sharply
defined standards for the planning process may bind planning agencies too rigidly. They may also fail to include all of the substantive
considerations that are necessary for an adequate planning program.
If land planning agencies can develop adequate state and regional
planning policies subject to general statutory directives, this rigidity
can at least partially be avoided.
Even if state and-regional review of local planning is provided,
mandating comprehensive planning for local governments cannot
guarantee that local land use controls will be internally consistent in
their administration and faithful to regional and state policies. But
the increasing and sometimes competing pressures for the better
management of the urban and rural environment demand a comprehensive set of policies for the administration of land use control
systems. These policies can be provided through mandatory and
effectively enforced comprehensive planning at the state, regional,
and local levels.
289. 67 N.J. at 179, 188-90, 336 A.2d at 727-28, 732-33.

